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Political Jurisprudence
By MAR Im SHAPIo*
A school of jurisprudential thought rarely emerges full blown
at a single instant or immediately announces itself as something
new and different in the world of legal scholarship. Bentham's
Principles of Morals and Legislation, one of the most startlingly
original and seminal contributions to modem legal thought,
might have been greeted by one of today's omniscient and pinch-
minded reviewers, transplanted back to 1789, as "a rather in-
teresting application of the thought of several minor continental
writers to English conditions." While we can now trace a whole
Kantian school of legal theory, it still remains questionable
whether Kant himself had a theory of law.1 Furthermore, the
contemporary world does not often find itself blessed with such
commanding figures as Bentham and Kant. New intellectual
movements are more often the collective work of smaller minds
and the products of synthesis, recombination and shifting ap-
plication of existing ideas. I believe that such a new movement
is afoot in legal theory, and I propose to call it political juris-
prudence.
This new movement is essentially an extension of certain
elements of sociological jurisprudence and judicial realism, com-
bined with the substantive knowledge and methodology of
political science. Its foundation is the sociological jurist's premise
that law must be understood not as an independent organism but
an integral part of the social system. Political jurisprudence is
in one sense an attempt to advance sociological jurisprudence by
greater specialization. It seeks to overcome the rather nebulous
and over general propositions of the earlier movement by con-
centrating on the specifically political aspects of law's interaction
* Dept. of Political Science, Stanford University. I wish to thank the office
of the Dean of the Graduate School for a supplemental research grant made in
connection with this article.
1 See Brown, Has Kant a Philosophy of Law, 71 Philosophical Rev. 33
(1962).
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with society and describing the concrete impact of legal arrange-
ments on the distribution of power and rewards among the
various elements in a given society.
From judicial realism, political jurisprudence derives a pecu-
liar concern for the attitudes and behavior of judges and the
environment of judicial decision. Indeed, many of the political
jurists have devoted most of their efforts to devising a method-
ology that will allow them to refine and systematize the impres-
sionistic insights of the realists by isolating and measuring the
strength and direction of judicial attitudes and relating them to
the actual patterns of decision.
Moreover, the new jurisprudence shares with all modem
American thinking about law, the premise that judges make
rather than simply discover law.2 Without this premise there
could be no political jurisprudence, for one of the central concerns
of politics is power and power implies choice. If the judge had no
choice between alternatives, if he simply applied the rule supplied
him by the tablets and reached the conclusion commanded by an
inexorable legal logic, he would be of no more interest politically
than the IBM machine that we could soon design to replace him.
"Political" can only be linked with "jurisprudence" when it is
realized that choice inheres in those phases of human endeavor
that have traditionally been the object of jurisprudential study.
Finally, political jurisprudence is fundamentally indebted to
political science, and its development is intimately related to the
growth of political science as an independent discipline. Poli-
tical jurisprudence is, among other things, an extension of the
findings of other areas of political science into the realm of law
and courts, an attempt to rationalize the presence of public law as
a field of study within the discipline and an effort to round-out
political science by somehow integrating legal and judicial facets
into the total picture of political life.
Because political jurisprudence owes so many immediate intel-
lectual debts and because it represents the extension and cross
breeding of several lines of continuous intellectual endeavor, it is
impossible to say exactly when the movement achieved a distinct
identity or for that matter even to argue that it is a movement
2 See Cahill, Judicial Legislation (1952).
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totally distinct from other contemporaneous developments in law
and the social sciences. Moreover, although the total number of
political jurists is not very large and a certain amount of leader
and discipleship is present, political jurisprudence has not pro-
duced any commanding intellectual figure or even set of figures,
nor an orthodoxy to which all the members can subscribe. At-
tempting to describe and delimit it is, therefore, something like
trying to analyze a literary or artistic movement. We all generally
know what and whom we are talking about if the theatre of the
absurd or post-abstractionist painting are mentioned. Yet it might
be extremely difficult to describe exactly what common char-
acteristics held each of these schools together. Differences, in-
deed direct conflicts, between various works of the same school
would be mentioned, and interminable arguments would develop
over whether certain marginal figures were to be included or not.
In the end, artistic movements tend to be defined in terms of
tone, approach, concern for the same or similar problems, and a
shared reaction to past movements rather than by a stylistic and
substantive check list. More often than we are willing to admit,
movements in the social sciences and philosojhy must be de-
scribed in the same way.3 Political jurisprudence is such a move-
ment, and basically I shall attempt to describe it here not by a
general analysis of a purportedly complete philosophical system
but by a survey of the work that has actually been undertaken, a
survey that hopefully will suggest a general tone and approach as
well as indicating some differences, conflicts and weaknesses.
Courts as Political Agencies
The core of political jurisprudence is a vision of courts as
political agencies and judges as political actors. Any given court
is thus seen as a part of the institutional structure of American
government4 basically similar to such other agencies as the ICC,
the House Rules Committee, the Bureau of the Budget, the city
3 See e.g., Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics (1963); Dahl, The
Behavioral Approach, 55 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 763 (1961).
4 1 shall generally treat political jurisprudence as an American movement
although it is not entirely confined to this country. See e.g., Torgersen, The Role
of the Supreme Court in the Norwegian Political System, Judicial Decision Making
(Schubert ed. 1963).
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council of Omaha, the Forestry Service and the Strategic Air
Command. Judges take their places with the commissioners,
congressmen, bureaucrats, city councilmen, and technicians who
make the political decisions of government. In short, the attempt
is to intellectually integrate the judicial system into the matrix
of government and politics in which it actually operates and to
examine courts and judges as participants in the political process,
rather than presenting law, with a capital L, as an independent
area of substantive knowledge. Quite fundamentally, political
jurisprudence subordinates the study of law, in the sense of a
concrete and independent system of prescriptive statements, to
the study of men, in this instance those men who fulfill their
political functions by the creation, application and interpretation
of law.
Political jurisprudence is, in a sense, the opposite of Cole-
ridge's "willing suspension of disbelief" as a tool of understand-
ing. The political jurist instead suspends his belief in the whole
web and myth of speciality, mystery and tradition that surrounds
and supports the judge. Adopting a wide-eyed, and some will
grumble too open-mouthed, stance, he sees not the successor of
Ulpian and Coke but only one of many government employees,
operating in a bureaucratic structure, performing certain govern-
mental services and generally engaging in the same political
processes as his fellow public servants. The political jurist simply
wishes to know what this fellow does in government, how he does
it, why he does it and what his relations are with others in the
same government structure and to the citizenry whom the
government services. To be sure, in seeking to successfully
answer these questions, he may have to reintroduce many of the
concepts he has initially ignored if only in the form of objectively
incorrect but politically relevant belief systems held by the
actors he studies. Again the distinction is one of tone and ap-
proach. The political jurist begins with what any fool could
plainly see if his eyes were not beclouded by centuries of legal
learning, that judges and courts are an integral part of govern-
ment and politics, would be meaningless and functionless outside
of government and politics and are, therefore, first and foremost
political actors and agencies. If all this seems obvious, it is
amazing how frequently one must touch base with the obvious
1964]
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in order to avoid being caught off by the masses of writing about
law and courts which are based on different and often uncon-
sciously held premises.5
The new jurisprudence is in several ways a natural result of
American experience. We are all told very early in life that the
Constitution divides our national government into three great
branches, and one of these is the Supreme Court. Thus the very
Court that has always been preeminent in the American con-
sciousness has always been considered preeminently an agency of
government. Moreover, our mutually reenforcing preoccupations
with the Supreme Court and the Constitution have made con-
stitutional law a peculiarly important subdivision of American
legal studies. And constitutional law is the most openly political
of all the areas of law. The Supreme Court and its constitutional
decisions have consistently played a significant and often highly
controversial role in American political history. Marbury v. Madi-
son, Dred Scott, the sick chicken, steel seizure and school de-
segregation cases are the very staff of politics. While the notion
of an independent judiciary may have been carried further in this
country than anywhere else, the central place of the Supreme
Court on the American political scene has kept us from equating
independence with apoliticism or defining independence in terms
of an isolated sphere of competence only peripherally related to
public affairs. At least since 1937, it has become an American
commonplace that the Supreme Court is either rightly or wrongly
a political power holder.6
It is hardly surprising then that the Supreme Court has served
as the focus for much of the new jurisprudence and indeed for
much of the initial opposition to it. To begin with, the whole
debate over judicial modesty versus judicial activism has been
essentially an attempt to define the political role of the Court and
its relations to other facets of American politics. The titles of
5 Kirchheimer, Political Justice (1961) for instance is in some ways a leading
work in the new movement, and stresses the use of legal processes for politica
urposes. Nevertheless, lurking behind nearly every paragraph is an unspoken
stinction between political justice which is a perversion of the judicial process
and a non-political justice which is normal, as if somewhere at least ideally there
were non-political courts.
OSee Mason, The Supreme Court: Vehicle of Revealed Truth or Power
Group; 1930-1937 (1953); Mason, Myth and Reality in Supreme Court De-
cisions, 48 Va. L. Rev. 1385 (1962).
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some of the leading works; Congress and the Court,7 The People
and the Court," and The Least Dangerous Branch, The Supreme
Court at the Bar of Politics9 suggest the nature of the debate,
not that all the participants share the viewpoints of political
jurisprudence. The most extreme judicial self-deniers, Justice
Frankfurter and Learned Hand,10 seconded by academic com-
mentators,: have argued that the Court should not, need not, and
cannot engage in politics, that judicial review is essentially a
political function, and that the Court should, therefore, cease
exercising its power of review or exercise it only very rarely and
under the most extreme provocation. Thus, the judicially modest
are fundamentally apolitical in their jurisprudence, conceiving of
courts as essentially non-political institutions and resenting Justice
Marshall's ill considered institutional foray into American politics.
The almost poetic tragedy of the Frankfurter-Hand-Mendelson
style of judicial modesty is that, having convinced everyone that
judicial reveiew was an essentially political not legal function,
they have been unable to convince either a majority of the Jus-
tices or the predominant body of professional and academic
opinion that the Court ought to give up review. Thus the Court
continues to exercise and the legal profession to approve a func-
tion that, thanks to the work of the modest themselves, is ad-
mittedly political. In this way, the judicially modest have albeit
unwilling made a considerable contribution to political juris-
prudence.
This old style of judicial modesty is generally on the wane
7 Murphy, Congress and the Court (1962). At this point it might be well to
explain that the footnotes in this article are dual purpose, designed both to support
my statements and provide a basic bibliography of this new field. For this reason
I have attempted generally to footnote a given contribution only once. Repetition
of citation appears only when necessary for the support or proper illustration of
my point. Many works that could and should be consulted in relation to several
facets of political jurisprudence are, therefore, not noted in connection with each
in order to avoid an excessively repetative bibliography. It should also be added
that not all the authors and works cited would identify themselves or wish to be
identified with political jurisprudence. Many have been listed which only provide
data or analysis useful to political jurisprudence.8 Black, The People and the Court (1960).
9 Bicknel, The Least Dangerous Branch, The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Politics (1962).10 Hand, The Bill of Rights (1958).
'
1 Wallace Mendelson has been the most prolific academic proponent of
judicial modesty and has issued a very long succession of articles and reviews
defending and rationalizing Justice Frankfurter's opinions. For a summary of his
views see his Justices Black and Frankfurter: Conflict in the Court (1961).
19641
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today and has been replaced by a new style of modesty
reflected in the works of such commentators as Robert McCloskey
and Alexander Bickel.12 In the context of our discussion here, it
need only be said that the new school of modesty accepts the
legitimacy of judicial review and thus of a political role for the
Supreme Court and concerns itself with precisely what the Court
can and cannot do considering its rather limited power. It is
modest in the sense of urging the Court not to embark on tasks
that are beyond its political capacity to complete or may react
negatively on the Court's overall political position. Thus today
the debate over judicial modesty takes place almost entirely
within the framework of political jurisprudence since nearly all
the parties begin from the premise that the Court, at least in the
sphere of judicial review, is a political agency and that the prob-
lem of when, where and how it should exercise its review powers
is essentially a political problem.
However, the above statement is necessarily a qualified one.
Not every participant in the current debate over the Court is
per se an active subscriber to the tenants of political juris-
prudence. Professor Black for the activists for instance tends tb
revert to the Hamiltonian and Marshallian argument that the
Constitution is law and the Supreme Court is a court of law that
must therefore enforce the Constitution when it is violated.13
Such an argument is of course fundamentally apolitical, equating
review with the "normal," "traditionaY' or routinely legal func-
tions of courts. Judicial review becomes nothing more than a
technical exercise in conflict of law jurisdiction. Professor Hyna-
man, in an attempt to synthesize the whole debate from the
standpoint of political science, which is in effect a rather ram-
bling defense of modesty, concludes that the Court is political
in the sense of participating in government policy-making, but
that a sharp contrast should be drawn between the political and
the judicial process. On closer examination, however, this all
boils down to the old saw that the Court is not democratic and,
therefore, ought not to be political. 4
12 See Shapiro, Judicial Modesty: Down With the Oldi-Up With the New?,
10 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 533 (1963).
13 Black, op. cit. supra note 8, at 6-7.
14 Hyneman, The Court on Trial 237-47 (1963).
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Nevertheless, the debate over modesty is essentially a debate
over the political role of the Court. Moreover, again thanks to
the efforts of the modest themselves, particularly Frankfurter, the
issue of modesty has become entangled in every substantive area
of constitutional law so that constitutional scholarship as a whole
has become essentially a political discipline. When every con-
stitutional question must be considered not only on its merits,
that is in terms of traditional legal analysis of the meanings of
constitutional provision, statute, precedent, etc., but in terms of
whether the Court is the proper governmental agency to provide
the answer, then all the constitutional business of the Supreme
Court involves political considerations. While much constitu-
tional commentary is still written in the traditional mode, there
has been an increasing tendency to introduce political analysis
directly into the discussion of constitutional questions. This
tendency is particularly marked in the area of the first amend-
ment.", The recent appearance of such titles as Constitutional
Law in the Political Process,6 Constitutional Cases in American
Government,17 Constitutional Politics"8 and The Supreme Court,
Its Politics, Personalities and Procedures9 is also indicative of
the general tendency to integrate at least the constitutional busi-
ness of the Supreme Court into the mainstream of thought about
American national government. 20
The principal opposition to political jurisprudence has also
arisen in the area of the Supreme Court's constitutional business.
The plea for neutral principles of constitutional law voiced by
Professor Wechsler and his followers is in reality an attempt to
substitute the traditional vision of an apolitical, non-policy mak-
ing, law-discoveling court for that of a court embedded in the
political process and making political decisions. The Supreme
15 See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale
L.J. 877 (1963); Shapiro, Judicial Modesty, Political Reality, and Preferred Posi-
tion, 47 Cornell L.Q. 175 (1962).16 Schniidbauser, Constitutional Law in the Political Process (1963).
'
7 Berns, Constitutional Cases in American Government (1963).
1:8Schubert, Constitutional Politics (1960).
19 Schmidhauser, The Supreme Court, Its Politics, Personalities and Pro-
cedures (1960).
20See also Beth, Politics, the Constitution and the Supreme Court (1962).
Three of the chapters in this book are titled "The Courts as Political Agents."
In terms of the sociology of knowledge of the new movement, it is interesting to
note that these works are .all texts that resulted from attempting to fit constitu-f
tional law into the mainstream of undergraduate instruction in political science.
19641
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Court by process of legal reasoning and communion with the
Constitution and the body of Anglo-American law is to divine
guiding legal principles and, like all mystics, is to do so by
divorcing itself from the interests and immediate problems of this
everyday world.2 1
The concept of neutral principles has gained such great
popularity precisely because it appeals to that still powerful seg-
ment of legal thought which resents the attempts of sociological
jurisprudence and judicial realism to break law out of its inde-
pendent sphere and place it in the context of society. The
attempt to treat judges as essentially participants in politics,
government and policy-making, ineluctably linked to other such
participants, represents the extreme of integration of law into
real life. The argument that there are neutral principles in-
dwelling in the law itself and discoverable by a specifically
judicial or lawyer-like mode of thought, is basically an attempt
to return jurisprudence to the position of splendid isolation that
it enjoyed in the heyday of analytical jurisprudence. This attempt
has been largely inspired by and is a direct challenge to political
jurisprudence.
Naturally enough then the rebuttal to the neutral principles
concept has formed an important wing of the new jurisprudence
by re-emphasizing the law and policy-making roles that are
inevitably thrust on the Supreme Court. Since the Court gen-
erally deals with the "trouble case," it is typically called upon to
decide precisely those questions for which neither the existing
body of law nor the other agencies of government have been able
to provide a solution. In short, it is asked to make social policy,
and to do so it cannot depend on neutral principles but must
look to its own assessment of the social and political interests
involved and its own vision of the long range goals of American
society. In other words, it is asked to perform the same tasks that
every other political decision maker is asked to perform and to do
so as a complementary and supplementary segment of the whole
complex of American political institutions. Thus runs the message
21 Not all of those who desire "principled" constitutional decision are anti-
political. See Bickel, op. cit. supra note 9, at 28-28, 49-65, 236-43.22 See Levy, Judicial Realism and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1 (1960).
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of the anti-neutralists, a message that puts them squarely in the
center of political jurisprudence.23
So far I have discussed only work that specifically revolves
about the judicial review powers of the Supreme Court. If the
political treatment of law and courts was confined to this area, it
would constitute a special approach to an exceptional problem
rather than a jurisprudence of relatively general applicability.
But I have begun in this area largely because it serves as one of
the channels through which political considerations historically
flowed into the study of law not because it is the only or leading
area of political jurisprudence. The principal focus of the new
jurisprudence has instead been an attempt to integrate courts
into the general framework of governmental institutions and the
political process quite apart from a rationalization of the power
of one court to do one thing, that is declare statutes unconstitu-
tional.2 4 Undoubtedly the leading attempt in this area has been
David Truman's The Governmental Process.25 This book pre-
sents a general theory of politics built around the notion that
political activity is fundamentally interest group activity and
that the process of government proceeds through the access of
groups to governmental agencies and agency performance in re-
sponse to group demands. Courts are treated as governmental
institutions to whom different groups have varying degrees of
access which they employ to enlist the judges in support of
their interests. For Truman, politics is group politics and courts
are firmly imbedded in the group struggle.
Probably because the first general theory of politics into
which the courts were fully integrated was group theory, a con-
siderable body of political jurisprudence using the group hy-
pothesis has developed.26 Particular attention has been paid to
231 have attempted to make these points at greater length and with appro-
priate citations in Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Adiudication
of Politics and Neutral Principles, 81 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 587 (1963).
24 SeJacob, The Courts As Political Agencies, An Historical Analysis, 8
Tulane Studies in Political Science 9 (1963).
25 Truman, The Governmental Process (1958).
26 SePelatson, Federal Courts in the Federal System (1955); Shapio .supra
note 15; Mavrinac, From Lochner to Brown v. Topeka: The Court and~ Con-
flicting Concepts of the Political Process, 52 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 641 (1958);
Westin, The Supreme Court and Group Conflict: Thoughts on Seeing Burke Put
Through the Mill, 52 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 665; Bachrach, The Supreme Court, Civil
Liberties, and the Balance of Interests Doctrine, 14 Western Political Q. 391
(1961).
KENTucKY LAW JouIVNAL
groups which have been especially successful in gaining access
to the courts27 and to their methods of access or lobbying."8
Since the bar as a group has a peculiarly intimate relation to the
courts, there has been an increased interest in its political role 29
However, other theories of politics may provide equally useful
insights. For instance, in a critique of group theory, Elmer
Schattschneidere0 has argued that politics is not entirely group
struggle. When one group sees itself outfought in the initial
group arena, it is likely to extend the boundaries of the battlefield
by broadening the issues. In other words, whichever group finds
itself outnumbered in the initial alignment of groups appeals for
outside re-enforcements by recasting the issue in terms that will
attract the attention of groups not at first concerned. This process
is likely to snowball or escalate until issues have been so broad-
ened that general public sentiment comes into play and the issue
is finally settled not by the interplay of special groups but by
mass popular opinion. In this context trial court litigation might
be conceived as an initial or limited arena and the appellate
process as a mode of extending boundaries, or even initial litiga-
tion as an attempt to expand an issue beyond the legislative or
bureaucratic sphere.' For instance Negroes as a group, finding
27 See Vose, Caucasions Only: The Supreme Court, The National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People and The Restrictive Covenant Cases
(1959); Vose, The National Consumers League and the Brandeis Brief, 1 Mid-
western J. of Political Science 267 (1957).28 Vose, Litigation As a Form of Pressure Group Activity, 319 Annals 20
(1958); Newland, Legal Periodicals and the Supreme Court, 8 Midwestern J. of
Political Science 58 (1959); Comment, Outside Influences on the Supreme Court
of the United States-How Effective Are These?, 39 Can. B. Rev. 631 (1961);
Jacobs, Law Writers and the Courts (1954). The Supreme Court has recently
recognized that litigation is a form of political activity. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button,
83 S.Ct. 328, 836 (1963). See also, Krislov, Constituency v. Constitutionalism:
The Desegregation Issue and Tensions and Aspirations of Southern Attorney's
General, 3 Midwestern J. of Political Science 75 (1959).
29 See Schmidhauser, op. cit. supra note 19, at pt. 2; Schubert, Politics and
the Constitution: The Bricker Amendment During 1953, 16 J. of Politics 257
(1954); Twiss, Lawyers and the Constitution (1942). Legal professional associa-
tions present a peculiarly fruitful field for further political (pressure group)
analysis. There are, of course, a large number of these associations and sub-
associations. Many of them are highly specialized and therefore represent par-
ticular social and economic interests. Some engage in a considerable amount of
statute drafting and direct lobbying of legislatures and nearly all make public or
professional pronouncements on policy questions frequently disguised as technical-
legal conclusions. All have relatively high direct access to the courts and otherajudicative agencies through the pleadings of their members.
ao Schaftschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (1961).i Of course ven the initial trial is a broadening of arenas by introducing the
government into a dispute that initially concerned only the two parties.
[Vol. 52,
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that the immediate alignment of groups in the South disfavored
their goals, used Supreme Court litigation to broaden the issues
and attention-drawing power of the controversy and eventually
overcome their local group disadvantage by enlisting national
popular support.
Not necessarily dependent on group or non-group theories of
politics has been a general inclination on the part of political
scientists to view government in the context of decision or policy-
making processes rather than formal structures. The emphasis
on process is in effect an emphasis on the interaction and re-
ciprocal influence of governmental agencies in terms of where,
when and how each actually participates in decisions. Jack
Peltason's Federal Courts in the Federal System32 and Victor
Rosenblum's Law As a Political Instrument 3 were pioneering
efforts to fit courts into this policy-making process framework by
showing how they interact with other governmental agencies at
all levels. A recent and outstanding text designed to introduce be-
ginning law students to their field suggests its approach in its
title, The Legal Process, An Introduction to Decision-Making by
Judicial, Legislative, Executive and Administrative Agencies 4
and sets both courts and law firmly within the sphere of public
policy-making. Robert Dahl's article "Decision-Making in a
Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker" is
an attempt to generally assess the relations of the Supreme Court
to other members of "the dominant national alliance," and there
have been several attempts to describe the Court's policy-making
role and relation to other agencies in specific areas of its juris-
diction.35
The case study technique of examining court decisions popu-
32 Peltason, op. cit. supra note 26.
33 Rosenblum, Law as a Political Instrument (1955). See also Miller, Policy-
Making in a Democracy: The Role of the United States Supreme Court, 6 J. Pub.
L. 275 (1957); Schubert, Policy Without Law: An Extension of the Certiorari
Game, 14 Stan. L. Rev. 284 (1962); Sutherland, Judicial Reticence and Public
Policy, 1958 Juridical Rev. 1; Nagel, Political Parties and Judicial Review in
American History, 11 J. Pub. L. 328 (1962).34 Auerbach, Garrison, Hurst, and Mermin, The Legal Process, An Introduc-
tion to Decision-Making by Judicial, Legislative, Executive and Administrative
Agencies (1961).35 Dahl's article appears in 6 J. Pub. L. 279 (1957). See also Shapiro,
The Warren Court and the Federal Tax Policy, 36 So. Cal. L. Rev. 208 (1962);
Barker, The Supreme Court As Policy Maker: The Tidelands Oil Controversy,
24 J. of Politics 350 (1962); Ulmer, Judicial Review As Political Behavior: A
Temporary Chec on Congress, 4 Ad. Science Q. 426 (1960).
1964]
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larized by Alan Westin 6 is also part of the movement toward
examining what courts do in the total political setting of their
decisions. It is to be sure a bit confusing to talk about case studies
of cases. But the case study technique in the social sciences refers
to a research design that focuses on a given decision, or set of
related decisions, and then develops in the greatest possible
detail all the institutional and individual attitudes and behavior
that led up to and out of the decision. Such depth studies are
designed to validate or suggest the broader hypotheses which it
is the goal of the social sciences to formulate. When applied to
law, this technique can be used to focus on a given court decision
and develop the political matrix in which it occurs showing that
the decision is not an independent or isolated event but an
integral part of a political process in which many agencies
interact with one another.
While most of the efforts to fit courts into the general pattern
of politics have so far occurred at the level of American national
government, several recent studies have dealt with the political
role of state and foreign courtsY7 Relations between the U.S.
Supreme Court, the lower federal courts and the state courts,
which have traditionally been handled in the conventional legal
categories of jurisdiction, have also begun to receive some at-
tention in more realistic political terms.38 The most suggestive
approach proposes a view of lower courts as essentially bureau-
cratic structures suggesting that the problems of the highest
appelate courts may be basically similar to those of other
political leaders vis 'a vis their bureaucratic subordinates.3 9
36See Westin, The Anatomy of a Constitutional Case (1958); Pritchett and
Westin, The Third Branch of Government, Eight Cases in Constitutional Politics
(1963); Westin, Bookies and "Bugs" in California: Judicial Control of Police Prac-
tices, The Uses of Power (1962). Another case in the latter work, Hacker,
Pressure Politics in Pennsylvania: The Truckers vs. The Railroads, provides
a peculiarly good illustration of the entanglement of the courts in policy-making
and pressure group politics.
87 Jacob and Vines, The Role of the judiciary in American State Politics,
Judicial Decision-Making (Schubert ed. 1963); Vines, Political Functions of a
State Supreme Court, 8 Tulane Studies in Political Science 51 (1962); Jacob,
Politics and Criminal Prosecution in New Orleans, Id. at 77; Schubert, Quantita-
tive Analysis of Judicial Behavior 129-142 (1959); Ulmer The Political Party
Variable in the Michigan Supreme Court, 11 J. Pub. L. 352 (1962). See also note
4 supra.38 See e.g., Murphy and Pritchett, Courts, Judges and Politics 584-617
(1961).3 9 Murphy, Chief Justice Taft and the Lower Court Bureaucracy: A Study
(Continued on next page)
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The Attitudes of Judges and Courts as Small Groups
So far I have been describing what might be called the
institutional wing of the new jurisprudence which attempts to
integrate courts as political institutions and judges as political
actors into the general pattern of American. political institutions.
In a fundamental sense it is this wing of the new jurisprudence
that is the most radical, for it tends to extend the teachings of
sociological jurisprudence to their logical extreme and break
down any remaining barriers between law and politics. The term
"social engineer"-so appealingly dispassionate and scientific-
replaced the black robe with the white laboratory coat. Political
jurisprudence rends the euphemism and calls a policy-maker a
politician.
Strangely enough, however, it is not this but another wing
of political jurisprudence that raises the most hackles. The nature
of this wing might be suggested by Gutman scales, bloc analysis,
Shapeley-Shubik indices, game theory, etc., in short by charts
and graphs, X's and Y's and symbolic equations. Yet in describing
these intellectual phenomena it would be misleading to speak
of a quantitative school of political jurists or to treat the quanti-
fiers as a separate group. First of all quantification or statistical
analysis is not an independent approach to any body of subject
matter. At its best it suggests neither what questions are signifi-
cant, what data is relevant, nor what ought to be done with the
answers. Quantification is simply a tool and in political juris-
prudence it is usually a tool for expressing more clearly and
systematically observations that have been or might be made by
other methods. Quantification may be used without any par-
ticular intent to contribute to an essentially political analysis of
courts as it is in the Harvard Law Review's annual statistical
description of the previous term's work of the Supreme Court. Or
statistics may be used as one mode for carrying on the essentially
institutional analysis we have already described. For instance,
one might prepare statistical summaries of the incidence of
Supreme Court reversals of acts of Congress or of state courts
of appeal in order to partially determine how much power the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
in Judicial Administration, 24 J. of Politics 453 (1962); Lower Court Checks on
Supreme Court Power, 53 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1017 (1959).
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Supreme Court has wielded over other agencies at what times on
what issues.40 Thus several quantitative studies have already
appeared in earlier footnotes supporting my description of the
policy-making approach to courts. Or quantitativedevices might
be used, as we shall see shortly, in attempts to analyse sub-institu-
tional problems such as the attitudes of individual judges.
Moreover, many of the treatments that at first glance seem
somehow mathematical are really nothing more than logical
propositions expressed in the language of equations or other
symbolic systems and thus are not actually quantitative or only
incidentally so. And, of course, such modes of expression too can
be used in support of all sorts of approaches to the Court. For
instance Schubert's article "Policy Without Law: An Extension
of the Certiorari Game"41 uses the formal language of game theory
to indicate, among other things, that the Supreme Court's
certiorari practice may be determined not by formal rules of
jurisdiction but by the policy preferenced of the Justices. Since
the thrust of Schubert's piece is that certiorari is one mode of
Court participation in the policy-making process, it makes more
sense to list it as I have done in the context of the policy-making
approach to the Court than isolate it in a methodological ghetto
called "game theory approaches."
Indeed, the attempt to lump all "counters" together is really
a function of the basic distaste to be found among many students
of law for any other than their own traditional language. It is
rather as if English and American lawyers accustomed to writing
in English, and impatient with irregular verbs, lumped all the
legal studies of French writers under the category French juris-
prudence. Once the lumping is done, it is much easier to make
blanket statements about the absurdity of writing about law in
French than it is to analyse in detail whether any of the French
writers have had anything useful to say in their peculiar lan-
guage. I shall have more to say of this later. For the moment it
is enough to avoid categories that shed more heat than light.
40 See Ulmer, An Empirical Analysis of Selected Aspects of Law Making of
the United States Supreme Court, 8 J. Pub. L. 414 (1959). My colleague Robert
Horn is currently at work on a study of the relations between the U.S. and the
state supreme courts that will be supported by extended statistical evidence on
reversals and upholdings. See also Blaustein and Field, "Overruling" Opinions in
the Supreme Court, 57 Mich. L. Rev. 151 (1938).
41 Schubert, supra note 838.
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But for this heat and light problem I would be tempted to
call this second wing of political jurisprudence the behavioral
approach.42 Those of my readers who are political scientists will
know what rocks and shoals lie along that course. Suffice it to
say that political scientists have for some years been engaged in
a great debate between behaviorists and non- or anti-behaviorists
that is complicated by the fact that it is difficult to define be-
haviorism precisely.43 Much of the writing that I shall presently
describe has been produced by self-acknowledged behaviorists
and so has become part of the debate. Due to a kind of cultural
lag in the area of public law which I do not have the courage to
try to explicate here, the struggle broke into a white heat in that
field after a modus vivendi had been reached in most other areas
of political science. Because I believe this verbal battle to be
ephemeral, I do not use the label "behaviorist" here in order to
avoid encumbering my description of a new jurisprudence with
the categories of an absolescent debate.
There is another reason as well. While it is undoubtedly true
that in fact much of the new jurisprudence is a result of the some-
what delayed incursion of behaviorism into the study of law, it is
inconvenient to emphasis behaviorism as such excessively. To do
so would tend to obscure the fact that the phase of the new
jurisprudence I am about to describe is a logical development of
judicial realism and that the basic continuity between realism
and political jurisprudence is very great. What others might
choose to call the behavioral wing of the new jurisprudence is
basically an attempt to systematize and confirm the insights of
judicial realism through techniques borrowed from the social sci-
ences. While it is perfectly proper to stress the methodological
continuity of the psychological and sociological study of judges
with the psychological and sociological study of other people and
thus speak of "judicial behavior" as a branch of a broader be-
haviorism, I choose instead to emphasize the jurisprudential con-
42 See Schubert, Bibliographical Essay, Behavioral Research in Public Law,
which contains most of the items noted in this article, but treates them from the
standpoint of the behavioral sciences. See also his introduction to Judicial De-
cision-Making, op. cit. supra note 4 entitled From Public Law to Judicial Behavior.
Becker, An Inquiry Into a School of Thought in the Judicial Behavior Movement,
7 Midwest J. of Political Science 254 (1963) provides some critical comments on
the behaviorialist from the point of view of someone deeply committed to politicaljurisprudence.
43 See Dahl, supra note 3.
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tinuity of new methods of assessing judicial attitudes with more
traditional attempts to gain insight into the judge's mental
processes.
After all, how a judge thinks-how he arrives at the con-
clusion he does-has always been a central concern of juris-
prudence. The logical analysis of analytical jurisprudence was
basically designed to show what mental processes a judge went
through in order to reach his decision. For all the seeming
anachronism of such phrases as stare decisis and ratio decedandi,
they were and are great surgical tools designed to dissect the
anatomy of judicial decision and show us just how each thought
of the judge related to every other until the final system was
complete and the judgment rendered. Analytical jurisprudence
rested on the assumption and assertion that judges thought
logically. When later jurisprudential movements destroyed this
concept of independent legal rationality, they took upon them-
selves the task of discovering how judges did in fact think.
Carodozo's Nature of the Judicial Process shows how difficult that
task became once legal logic had lost its sovereign role and
illustrates what inexact and impressionistic substitutes post-
analytical jurisprudence provided. The rule skepticism of realism
added the final touches. Hunch and sense of injustice theories 4
were final confessions that, cut adrift from traditional legal logic,
and confined to traditional tools of analysis-largely introspection
-jurists could do little more than hang a tag on determinants
of decision which they knew were there somewhere but could
not describe or analyse.
One of the tasks of political jurisprudence has been, through
the use of new tools, to reopen the examination of judicial thought
processes. Such an attempt follows directly from the premise
that judges are political actors. For students of politics have long
been widely concerned with the relation of socio-economic back-
ground and psychological make-up to political attitudes and the
relation of attitudes to political action.45 Put another way, if
judges are viewed as policy-makers, then it is natural to ask
44 See Frank, Law and the Modem Mind 101-104 (1930); Calm, The Moral
Decision (1955).
45See Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy (1961); Lasswell,
Psychopathology and Politics (1930).
[Vol. 52,
POLrCAL JUISPRUDENCE
of them as one asks of other policy-makers, how do their
individual value preferences effect their policy decisions. The
traditional concern with judicial thought processes meshes nicely
with the modern interest in the motivational aspects of political
action.
In order to determine the effects of individual attitudes on
judicial decisions, one must first identify the attitudes, and so far
the bulk of attitudinal research has been aimed in this direction.
Basically the effort has been to derive judicial attitudes from
judges' voting behavior by the mutually supporting techniques
of scalogram and bloc analysis. Leaving aside the details of
technique which are clearly and adequately described else-
where,46 the logic of these studies is simple and straightforward.
A scalogramr collects a set of cases all of which invoke a common
set of social, economic or political problems-say the civil liberties
cases. If Justice Douglas always votes for the individual asserting
violation of his liberties, regardless of the legal and factual cir-
cumstances, he probably has very strong pro-civil liberties at-
titudes. If Justice Warren votes for the individual most of the
time but not quite as often as Douglas then he probably has
strong pro-civil rights attitudes but not so strong as Douglas. 17
In bloc analysis the voting patterns of multi-judge courts are
analyzed and if it is found that Black, Warren, Douglas and
Brennan for instance vote together most of the time on a certain
variety of case, it seems probable that they share some common
attitude toward the policy issue raised in that sort of case. By
determining what blocs form on what kinds of issues, inferences
can be made about the shape and distribution of attitudes among
the various Justices. So far the description of attitudes has been
rather rough, beginning with Herman Pritchett's pioneering ef-
forts at group analysis which came down to little more than left
4 6 Schubert, The Study of Judicial Decision Making As an Aspect of Political
Behavior, 52 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1007 (1958); Ulmer, Scaling Judicial Cases: A
Methodological Note, 4 American Behavioral Scientist 31 (1961). Those readers
unfamiliar with scaling and group analysis should probably not proceed any
further until they have consulted at least one of these pieces or one of those
mentioned in note 49 infra. For convenience I have reproduced in an appendix
one scale and one bloc diagram so that the format will at least be familiar.
47 Of course basic to scale analysis is the assumption that if a true scale can
be constructed, then the scaled material is ordered along a single attitudinal
dimension.
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and right categories.4 More recently attitude clusters defined in
terms of libertarianism and economic liberalism have been iden-
tified .4
There are several other methods of defining the political
attitudes of judges other than extrapolating them from their vot-
ing behavior. Obviously biographical study is one of these, and
one by the way that is not statistical or quantitative or behavioral
in any peculiar sense but nevertheless is an integral part of the
attitudinal approach. Judicial biography has a long and honored
tradition in the United States, but much of it results from the
notion that some of the judges were great men and the lives of
great men should be chronicled. Judicial biography enters the
main stream of political jurisprudence when it becomes a con-
scious attempt to discover what the values, philosophies and
ideologies of judges were in order to discover how those views
affected the way each judge thought about and decided cases.50
John Schmidhauser has suggested collective biography as a
supplement to individual biography in this area.5 Data on the
socio-economic backgrounds, education, mode of recruitment into
48 Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court, A Study in Judicial Politics and Values,
1937-1947 (1948); Pritchett, Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court (1954).
These two works are pioneering efforts in the political analysis of the Supreme
Court. For another left-right analysis see Jacobs, The Warren Court After Three
Years, 9 Western Political Q. 937 (1956). See also Christensen, Bloc Voting on
the Supreme Court (unpublished honors thesis, Harvard College).49 Ulmer, Supreme Court Behavior and Civil Rights, 13 Western Political Q.
288 (1960); Spaeth, Warren Court Attitudes Toward Business: The "B" Scale,
Judicial Decision Making (Schubert ed. 1963); An Analysis of Judicial Attitudes
in the Labor Relatoins Decisions of the Warren Court, 25 J. of Politics 290
(1963). See also Ulmer, The Analysis of Behavior Patterns on the United States
Supreme Court, 22 J. of Politics 629 (1960); Tannenhaus, Supreme Court At-
titudes Toward Regulatory Agencies, 14 Vand. L. Rev. 473 (1961). Since Tan-
nenhaus uses techniques normally employed in voting analysis as opposed to
scalograms and arrives at conclusions that partially contradict those of the scalers,
his article deserves particular attention. The conflict in part occurs because the
votes of a Justice which seem inconsistent when summated, in the sense that he
has sometimes voted for and sometimes against a given interest or agency, may
seem consistent when scaled, in the sense that all his no's may appear on one end
of the scale and all his yeses on the other. See note 82 infra. Schubert has
attempted to combine scale, bloc and factor analysis to present a single overall
picture of the Supreme Court. See his A Psychometric Model of the Supreme
Court, 5 American Behavioral Scientist 14 (1961); Schubert, The 1960 Term: A
Psychological Analysis, 56 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 90 (1962).
50 See e.g., Tresolini, Justice and the Supreme Court (1963). A good brief
summary and bibliography of the current state of judicial biography a ppears in
Pannam, Judicial Biography-A Preliminary Obstacle, 4 U. Queensland J. 57
(1961).
53 Schrnidhauser, The Justices of the Supreme Court: A Collective Portrait,
3 Midwest J. of Politics 1 (1959). See also Edwin, The Judges of the Supreme
Court, 1789-1937 (1938).
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judgeships, previous occupation, partly affiliation, etc. of judges
can be gathered, and, using this data, inferences can be made
about the content and distribution of judicial attitudes. Where
correspondences can be found between background and de-
cisional behavior, it may be inferred that attitudes corresponding
to that background have actually played a part in reaching the
decisions . 2 Here again, statistics rears its head, but as a facilita-
tor of mass biography rather than a peculiar or mysterious form of
discourse set apart from other streams of study.
Parallel to this attitudinal research, and using much of the
same data and techniques, is a rather specialized wing of political
jurisprudence that deals with the internal relations of multi-
judge courts. Once judges are viewed as actors and decision-
makers rather than law-finders, the mutual influence of members
of a judicial panel on one another takes on considerable interest.
One approach is to treat the nine Justices of the Supreme Court
as a small group in the context of what we know of the sociology
of small groups.53 The extent of leadership exercised by the Chief
Justice, which has always been of concern to students of the
Court, can be studied in terms of political leadership. 54 While
most of the bloc analysis has been aimed at identifying attitudes,
similar analysis can also be used to chart the group politics of a
court itself or the influence over final outcome that "swing
justices may haveY
5 2 See Schmidhauser, Stare Decisis, Dissent and the Background of the Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court, 14 U. Toronto L.J. 194 (1962) and Judicial Behavior
and the Sectional Crisis of 1887-1860, 23 J. of Politics 615 (1961); Nagel, Testing
Relations Between Judicial Characteristics and Judicial Decision-Making, 15
Western Political Q. 425 (1962), Judicial Backgrounds and Criminal Cases, 53 J.
Crim. L., C. & P.S. 333 (1962), Ethnic Affiliations and Judicial Propensities, 24 J.
of Politics 92 (1962), Unequal Party Representation on the State Supreme Courts,
45 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 62 (1961), Political Party Affiliation and Judges Decisions,
55 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 843 (1961); Ulmer, The Political Party Variable in the
Michigan Supreme Court, 11 J. PuTb. L. 352 (1962), Public Office in the Social
Background of Supreme Court Justices, 21 Amer. J. Economics & Sociology 57
(1962); Goff, Old Age and the Supreme Court, 4 Am. J. Legal Hist. 95 (1960).
53 Snyder, The Supreme Court as a Small Group, 36 Social Forces 232
(1958); Ulmer, Homeostatic Tendencies in the United States Supreme Court,
Introductory Readings in Political Behavior (Ulmer ed. 1961). See also Newland,
Personal Assistants to Supreme Court Justices: The Law Clerks, 40 Ore. L. Rev.
299 (1961).
54 Murphy, Marshalling the Court: Leadership, Bargaining and the Judicial
Process, 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 640 (1962); Danelski, The Influence of the Chief
Justice in the Decisioned Process, Courts, Judges and Politics (Murphy and Prit-
chett eds. 1962). See also Ulmer, Leadership in the Michigan Supreme Court,
Judicial Decision Making (Schubert ed. 1963).
5 See Pritchett, supra note 48.
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Finally there is at least potentially a wing of political juris-
prudence that may be labeled crude behaviorism. It is also
closely linked to judicial realism and ultimately to Holmes'
overstated definition of law as a prediction of what courts will do.
If, for instance, we can discover that Justice X has over a long
period in the past consistently voted for labor and against man-
agement, we have learned something useful quite aside from
whether we can speak meaningfully of pro-labor attitudes. While
perhaps we cannot scientifically predict that Judge X will con-
tinue to vote for labor in all future cases unless we can explain
why he has done so in the past, we can predict at the level of
prudence. Past patterns of judicial decisions, even when we can
find no explanation for them, and therefore, must treat them as
below the level of theoretical significance, may provide us with
useful tools for rough and ready prediction. Whether a given
group is more likely to get what it wants out of a given court or
judge or had better try a different court, or some other agency
of government entirely, is a significant political question to which
an immediate, imperfect answer is often more desirable than a
long deferred, perfect one.
It might be well to say something more at this point about the
finurry of activity in the area of prediction. First of all, efforts to
predict by computer and other statistical means51 are for the most
part not an integral part of political jurisprudence but rather a
revival of analytical jurisprudence. Basically they are attempts to
analyse past precedents and then project whatever consistencies
are discovered into the future on the assumption that courts will
decide tomorrow as they did yesterday, i.e., follow precedent.
That has always been a basic part of the lawyer's trade and more
specifically of the analytical tradition.
The basically analytical rather than political character of
predictive approaches has been partially obscured by the fact
that some of the most interesting and controversial prediction
has been done by a political scientist, Fred Kort, in a political
science setting.57 I suspect more people have read the title than
56 For a general description of the computer problem see Brown, Electronic
Brains and the Legal Mind: Computing the Data Computer's Collision With Law,
71 Yale L.J. 239 (1961).
57 Kort, Predicting Supreme Court Decisions Mathematically: A Quantitative
Analysis of the "Right to Counsel" Cases, 51 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1 (1957); Kort,
(Continued on next page)
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the article. Kort deals only with a very limited area of appellate
court work. Under the fair trial and certain similar rules, an
appellate court announces that it will declare no particular cir-
cumstance or action illegal per se but will weigh all the relevant
circumstances and if a sufficient number of circumstances appear
to a sufficient degree, it will find a violation of its rule. In effect
the appellate court constitutes itself the trier of facts determining
whether a given set of facts taken as a whole constitutes unfair-
ness, negligence, etc. A court rarely specifies in advance all the
circumstances or tells us how much weight on any one or more
will be sufficient to constitute violation. Subsequent case by case
adjudication provides the specifics that the court initially omitted.
Since the judges are rarely willing to provide a running summary,
students of law must analyse the precedents and present a sys-
tematic statement of precisely what fact situations will constitute
violation. Kort attempts this rather traditional analytical task by
some rather untraditional methods, but his "prediction" is basic-
ally a systematic statement of what combinations of circumstances
the appellate court has considered a violation and what combina-
tions it has not. One may if one wishes make the assumption that
so long as the rule survives, the judges will use the same criteria
they have used in the past in weighing up the circumstances,
and thus predict future decisions. Kort as a matter of fact uses
prediction only to test his analytical exercise. If he has properly
enunciated the criteria that the judges have used but thought-
lessly refused to enunciate themselves (or used with too little
self-consciousness to enunciate), then his application of his cri-
teria to any given set of facts should yield the same decisional
result as does the court's own analysis. Thus for his purposes he
might just as well predict cases that have already been decided,
and that is precisely what he does. It should be emphasized that
Kort is not analysing or predicting how courts will decide new or
open questions of law but only what combinations of circum-
stances will cause them to find that a violation of a very special
variety of pre-established legal rule has in fact occurred.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Content AnalyIsis of Judicial Opinions and Rules of Law, Judicial Decision Maling(Schubert ed. 1963). See also Nagel, Using Simple Calculations to Predict
Judicial Decisions 4 Am. Behavioral Scientist 24 (1960); Ulmer, Supreme Court
Behavior in Racial Exclusion Cases; 1985-1960, 56 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 325 (1962).
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In general prediction is incidental to jurisprudential inquiry
-a mode of proof for hypotheses about the way the judicial
process works. It can thus on occasion be found in conjunction
with political jurisprudence as with any other kind. Attitudinal
or psychometric descriptions of a court might be partially tested
by their ability to predict decisional outcomes."' The attempt to
discover uniformities or formulate generalities of a high level of
applicability is one of the aims of social science. Prediction is
intimately related to this aim. To the extent that political juris-
prudence is a social science, it will, therefore, be involved in
prediction and welcome verification of its hypotheses by the
predictive method. But prediction is neither a peculiar, sufficient
or necessary characteristic of political jurisprudence.
Leaving problems of prediction aside, attitudinal analysis will
often yield the simple information that a given judge has in all
past cases voted for a particular policy or group. When we find
that Justice X has consistently voted pro-labor, that is a political
fact with political impact regardless of his intentions. The
analysis of the extent to which a court's decisions favor or disfavor
certain interests and other agencies of government, wholly aside
from inferences as to whether intention to do so motivated the
decisions, aids in the assessment of that court's impact on the
political process and its relation to other parts of government.
Since one of the principal tasks of political jurisprudence is to
discover the functions and powers of courts vis 'a vis other
political agencies, gross calculations of the effects of decisions are
relevant to political jurisprudence as a whole if not directly to the
problem of judicial attitudes. Thus many of the calculations that
leave us undecided as to the motivations of say Justice Frank-
further are quite helpful in assessing the sum of the political
impact of his decisions. Surely the results of a political decision-
makers choices, particularly when they favor a given policy or
policy-maker, are just as or more important than his reasons for
making them.
Criticisms and Proposals
There has already been and is yet likely to be a great deal of
criticism of political jurisprudence. I shall attempt to sketch some
58 The ability to predict is not, however, a necessary or sufficient test in this
area. See Fisher, The Mathematical Analysis of Supreme Court Decisions: The
Use and Abuse of Quantitative Methods, 52 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 321 (1958).
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of these criticisms and suggest replies. Because political juris-
prudence is a relatively new movement, much of the criticism is
directed to its incompleteness. Therefore, many of my replies will
in fact be proposals for future research.
Probably the principal complaint about political jurisprudence
is that it obscures the uniqueness of law and legal institutions. In
constantly repeating that courts are political agencies and judges
political actors, and dealing with courts and judges as an integral
part of government, political jurisprudence does tend to empha-
size the similarities between courts and judges and other political
institutions and politicians. But if all this seems to add up to the
statement that judges are just a bunch of politicians, then the
mistake is in the eye of the beholder and in the unfavorable
connotation frequently attached to the words politics and poli-
tician. The study of things political is, to be sure, partially aimed
at exposing similarities between various political actors and in-
stitutions, but surely it is also aimed at discovering their dif-
ference. The State Department, the Cook County democratic
machine, the Vatican, the ICC and the Supreme Court are all
political agencies and share certain common features. But in
saying this, I suppose no one believes that I am saying that the
Secretary of State, Take Arvey, the Pope, the chairman of the
ICC and Chief Justice Warren are or should be exactly the same
kind of men, thinking the same kind of thoughts and doing
exactly the same kinds of things. If I say that Al Capone and
F.D.R. were both politicians, I am not saying that the President
was just a gangster.
It is true that initially political jurisprudence has probably
overemphasized the commonality between courts and other agen-
cies of government. But it is so difficult to eradicate the funda-
mentally apolitical outlook of both lawyers and laymen, who con-
stantly and almost instinctively backslide into the cliches of the
black robed myth,'9 that it was inevitable and necessary that the
point be made by over-emphasis. Now that the essentially po-
litical role of courts is relatively firmly established, it should be
possible for political jurisprudence to turn more of its attention to
analyses of the differences in political role between courts and
59 See e.g., Williamson, Political Process or Judicial Process: The Bill of
Rights and the Framers of the Constitution, 23 J. of Politics 199 (1961).
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other agencies. The proliferation and complexity of modem gov-
ernment is largely based on the differentiation of function among
agencies. If courts and judges were not performing a political
function somewhat different from other political agencies and
personnel and bringing relatively unique qualities into the poli-
tical arena, they would not be nearly as politically successful as
they are. Political jurisprudence in the future will seek to explore
the special qualities of courts and in the light of those qualities
determine what particular governmental chores suit the courts
better than their fellow agencies. 0
Political jurisprudence is also open to the criticism that it has
focused almost entirely on the Supreme Court and constitutional
law. By picking the admittedly most political court and most
political body of law as the basis for creating a model, it might
be seriously distorting its description of the relation between
politics and law. Again there may have been an initial sin of
overemphasis to make the point. It is easier to get Americans to
grasp a political or governmental context for the Supreme Court
than for other courts. But that does not mean that in reality
other courts are less political. Surely the lower courts collectively
make a great deal more law than the Supreme Court and some
individual courts make considerably more policy in particular
areas than do the courts above them. The fifth circuit for in-
stance is much more influential in the development of oil and
gas policy than is the Supreme Court. Moreover, distinctions
between constitutional, public and private law are only matters
of degree. The Supreme Court's anti-trust jurisdiction involves
broader ranging political considerations than does its fourth
amendment business and areas like labor law exhibit an in-
extricable tangle of constitutional principle and statutory inter-
pretation. No elaborate argument is required to prove that such
eminently private law areas as contract and tort are vehicles for
public policy and for the regulation of individuals by government
in the public interest. 1 The government is the third party to
every private suit and is so in the very form of the law and the
judge who administers it.
60 See Hyneman, op. cit. supra note 14; Bicknel, op. cit. supra note 9;
Shapiro, op. cit. supra note 35, at 225-227.61 ee Green, Tort Law; Public Law in Disguise, 38 Texas L. Rev. 1, 2.57
(1959-60).
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Nevertheless, there is no doubt that political jurisprudence
has concentrated too heavily in the past on Court and Con-
stitution. 2 Political science as a discipline passed through a long
period of excessive concentration on national government largely
because the plethora of divergent state and local institutions
presented an intimadating prospect for study. Eventually, how-
ever, there was a great explosion into the field of state and local
government. We are, I hope, on the verge of a similar explosion
in jurisprudence.63 Part of that explosion will be in the form of
study of discrete state supreme and other courts with the same
thoroughness as the U.S. Supreme Court has been studied. As
yet we have almost no descriptive data for instance on the opera-
tion of intermediate appellate courts.64
Probably the most pressing of all the tasks of political juris-
prudence is the development of a systematic description and
analysis of the relation between lower and higher appellate courts
in terms of power, influence and differentiation of function. Let
me give just one example to suggest the range of problems.
Certain federal circuits build up special expertise in certain
fields of public policy, for instance the fifth circuit's oil and gas
jurisdiction just mentioned. The admiralty jurisdiction of the
second circuit also comes to mind. We know that in other
parts of government specialization and expertise can be powerful
forces fostering independent policy views and excessive resistance
to supervision and coordination on the part of subordinate agen-
cies. The same specialization often provides the political tools for
fulfilling those policy views and making good the resistance. To
what extent does specialization and the resultant expertise of
certain circuit courts cause them to adopt different views than
their more generalized counterparts and resist or seize policy
leadership from the Supreme Court in those areas that especially
interest them? To what extent have litigants who have a choice
62 But see Spaeth, supra note 49.
63 See the work of Jacob and Vines collected in 8 Tulane Studies in Political
Science (1962) and their The Role of the Judiciary in American State Politics,
Judicial Decision Making (Schubert ed. 1963).
64 For a long time Judge Magruder's informative and witty piece, The Trials
and Tribulations of an Intermediate Appellate Court, 44 Cornell L. Q. 1 (1958),
stood almost alone. But now see Norvell, Chadwick and Donovan, The Work of
the Texas Courts of Civil Appeals 1951 to 1958, 88 Texas L. Rev. 725 (1960);
Note, The Second Circuit: Federal Judicial Administration in Microcosm, 63
Colum. L. Rev. 874 (1963). Even less has been done on the federal district
courts, but see Peltson, Fifty Eight Lonely Men (1961).
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of circuits taken advantage of these phenomena to achieve the
ends they desire? What methods, if any, have the highest appel-
late courts used to achieve supervision over and coordination of
such specialized lower appellate courts?
In spite of the great prominence of appellate courts in the
American judicial structure, generally speaking we as yet know
very little about the fundamental problems of interagency rela-
tions and coordination posed by our appellate court structure. I
have already said that the most promising approach seems to be
that of Walter Murphy who views the lower courts as a form of
bureauacracy. However, up to this point little has been done
to relate the tools that administrative, organizational and com-
munications theorists have developed for the study of other
hierarchically organized bureaucracies to the study of courtsY5
This kind of endeavor should become a core area of political
jurisprudence in the future.
Finally, political jurisprudence in spite of its close relation
to judicial realism has done very little with trial courts, largely I
think, because their role in the policy-making process is least
evident and they are most difficult to study. However, in recent
years political scientists have considerably developed the tech-
nique of direct observation and interrogation of local units of
government. 6 We should now begin to send scholars into our
local courts to systematically observe their behavior over fairly
long periods of time, interview litigants, counsel and subordinate
court officers and where possible interrogate the trial judges
themselves. We could then begin to build up the body of em-
pirical data necessary to proceed beyond the very vivid but
quite haphazard and impressionistic studies of Judge Frank.O
65 The literature of administration and bureaucracy is very large. PMfnEr
and Prestus, Public Administration (1960); Pffiffner and Sherwood, Administra-
tive Organization (1961); Blau and Scot, Formal Organization: A Comparative
Approach (1962), are recent survey works that note most of the important con-
tributions. Such journals as the Public Administration Review and The Adminis-
trative Science Quarterly serve as central clearing houses for new ideas in this
area. Some spade work on the relations between various levels and groups of
courts has been done. See Snyder, Uncertainty and the Supreme Courts De-
cisions, 65 American J. Sociology 241 (1959); Nagel, Sociometric Relations Among
American Courts, 48 Southwestern Social Science 136 (1962).
66See Dahl, Who Governs (1961); Wolfinger, The Politics of Progress (in
press).6 7 Frank, Courts on Trial (1949). See Somit, Tanenhaus, Wilke, Aspects of
Judicial Sentencing Behavior, 21 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 613 (1960). Curiously enough,(Continued on next page)
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Moreover, we know little of the relative power and function
of local courts within the policy-making processes of local gov-
ernment. More effort must be made to exploit the current boom
in urban studies in the United States to yield information on this
point in addition to the routine statistics on case load and delay
that are now available. In this respect a crucial series of questions
about any governmental agency is: how well does it do the jobs
assigned it, what services can it best perform, and is it acquring
or loosing functions? These are key political questions because a
governmental agency gains or looses power as it is able to provide
more or fewer services, more or less efficiently to more or fewer
individuals and interest groups. That is, a governmental agency
recruits the political support essential to maintaining its position
vis 'a vis other governmental agencies by performing services for
some segment of the public or other governmental agencies. The
less service it provides, the less support it is likely to recruit and
less influential in the general decision-making process of govern-
ment it is likely to become. The transfer of many public services
from general trial courts to labor arbitration panels, workmen's
compensation commissions, domestic relations and juvenile tri-
bunals, parole officers and boards and a host of other special
mediational and decisional bodies is, at least from the point of
view of political jurisprudence, a major shift in the structure of
government and a reduction of the political power of courts and
judges. Moreover, much of the study of these matters has pro-
ceeded on the basis of rather naive discussion about the "merits"
of various bodies and the work-load of the courts. It is an old
truism of public administration that shifts in organization and
jurisdiction are never simply technical. They are almost invari-
ably vehicles for policy change. The transfer of a particular
service from one governmental agency to another inevitably alters
the nature and direction of the service. Organizational change
thus implies a shift in who gets what, the basic question of
politics. Obviously the shift of decisional services from courts to
other agencies must have the consequence of favoring some
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
recent study has concentrated on juries. See Broeder, The University of Chicago
Jury Project, 38 Neb. L. R. 744 (1959); Bevan, Jury Behavior as a Function of
the Prestige of the Foreman and the Nature of His Leadership, 7 J. of Public
Law 419 (1958).
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social interests over others-or more precisely favoring a different
set of interests than the older arrangement did. This is obvious
in the shift to labor arbitration boards, but just as true in the
transfer of juveniles to special courts for special treatment. One
of the tasks of political jurisprudence will be to analyse this
essentially political problem in an essentially political way. While
it has been presented here in the context of local government,
the problem also exists at other levels and obviously is at the
heart of such disputes as that over the scope of judicial review
of administrative findings. Again this is basically a problem in
intergovernmental relations and bureaucratic control. Just as we
must assess the political relation between higher and lower
appellate courts, we must fit the trial courts into the judicial
policy-making process.
Aside from the general criticism that political jurisprudence
overemphasizes the similarity between courts and other govern-
mental agencies, it is likely to be urged that it considers courts and
judges to the almost total exclusion of law. The central concern
of jurisprudence is after all law, not simply judges. The import
of this criticism will, of course, depend on whether you believe
that there is something in law which can be discovered only
outside of the men and institutions that make and apply it and to
whom it is applied. In short, for the exponent of natural law,
political jurisprudence is a very partial jurisprudence indeed but,
as I hope to show presently, not an incompatible one. Accepting,
arguendo, that political jurisprudence is a partial one, that is not
enough to condemn it. Indeed, the absence of a single all
encompassing theory and philosophy of law is the leading phe-
nomenon of twentieth century jurisprudence and has been so
much commented upon and so closely linked with the general
fragmentation of contemporary political philosophy that nothing
further need be said about it at this point.63 If political juris-
prudence is not complete and all encompassing, it is in good
company.
I believe, however, that a somewhat less modest case can be
made for political jurisprudence. Legislation, that is, the passage
of statutes by legislatures, had by the early twentieth century
become the principal mode of law-making. Today it is rivaled
68 See the last section of this article.
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by administrative law-making. As long as Anglo-American law
was largely common, i.e., judge enunciated, law and the judge
were viewed as law discoverer or deducer, and Anglo-American
jurisprudence could concentrate on an abstract examination of
legal principles and how the judge did and should relate those
principles to specific fact situations. Once the emphasis shifts to
law-making, and to law-making by legislators and bureaucrats,
such a jurisprudence becomes increasingly narrow and divorced
from the realities of law. The crucial problem of modem Ameri-
can jurisprudence is to frame a legal theory and philosophy that
somehow integrates statutory and administrative law with its
more traditional concerns.69
Most scholars would agree, I think, that a jurisprudence based
entirely on general examinations of the nature of law, divorced
from analysis of how the law is made and applied and what it
actually does, runs the danger of excessive formalism and
eventually complete divorce from real law in the real world. As
a result, study of the judicial process has always played an
important part in jurisprudential endeavor. But today when the
bulk of law is intimately connected with the legislative and
administrative process, any jurisprudence which combines gen-
eral discussion of law with examination of the judicial process
alone is highly incomplete and distortive.
It is for these reasons that political jurisprudence provides an
opening toward a more complete American jurisprudence. By
emphasizing the inseparability of courts and judges from a
political process that includes legislatures and bureaucracies, the
new jurisprudence focuses attention on the need to incorporate
the study of legislative and administrative law-making into legal
theory. Political jurisprudence uses the tools of political science,
tools originally designed for the analysis of legislatures and
bureaucracies. Having incorporated the methodology of political
science into jurisprudence for the purpose of studying courts,
jurisprudence thus equipped will also be in a far better position
to undertake the study of legislative and administrative law-
judiciary are inseparably tied to the politics of legislatures and
administrative agencies will inevitably turn his sights on the
69 SeeHurst, The Growth of American Law: The Law Makers (1950);
Auerbach, Garrison, Hurst and Mermin, op. cit. supra note 34.
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entire political and governmental matrix of law. Political juris-
prudence will naturally expand from a political analysis of the
judiciary to an analysis of the entire law-making process and its
relation to traditional jurisprudential concerns. Today the focus
of law and law-making is in what we used to call the "political
branches." What better way to bring those branches into the
jurisprudential fold than through a political jurisprudence?
Having made the most sweeping claims for political juris-
prudence, admittedly on the basis of projected tendencies rather
than solid results, and largely for the purpose of showing that
even a partial jurisprudence may be useful in contributing to a
broader one, it might be well to also make the most modest
possible claims. There are many areas of law in which courts
must either openly or covertly, consciously or unconsciously,
formulate a political theory or establish some vision of the be-
haviour of their fellow political actors. For instance in dealing
with contempt of Congress prosecutions, the federal courts must
develop a whole theory of Congressional investigations. What
are they and what should they be? What is the relation between
the investigating committee and the House or Senate which
authorized it? What procedures are appropriate to committee
hearings in light of their functions and relation to their parent
body? Examples could be multiplied endlessly. Quite obviously
in the area of administrative law alone, there are hundreds of
questions of law that depend upon notions of what agency
behavior is and ought to be.
Unfortunately when one comes to look at these decisions, a
great many of them seem to be based on incredibly naive or
formalistic assumptions about the nature of American govern-
ment and how it operates. At least in those areas where legal
judgments must inevitably be based on political fact and evalua-
tion, political jurisprudence could substitute some knowledge of
what we actually know about politics and government for the
making. The scholar who begins with the politics of the judiciary
and its relation to law and then finds that the politics of the
cliches of the civics text that we so often find in or slumbering
behind legal discussions."0
70 See Horn, The Warren Court and the Discretionary Power of the Executive,
44 Minn. L. Rev. 639 (1960); Shapiro, Judicial Review: Political Reality and Leg-
islative Purpose: The Supreme Court's Supervision of Congressional Investigations,
15 Vand. L. Rev. 535 (1962).
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The need for a more intimate relation between what we really
know about government and the legal rules it formulates is prob-
ably clearest in the field of statutory interpretation. One of the
most fruitful applications of political jurisprudence would be a
full scale reexamination of the cannons of statutory interpretation
and the uses of legislative history in the light of what we have
learned in recent years about the actual workings of legislative
bodies as opposed to their formal procedures.71 In this respect it
must be admitted that many of the political superficialities to be
found in legal discourse are actually consciously adopted legal
fictions like the plain meaning rule which is an attempt to force
the legislature to speak clearly not an assumption that it does.
Admitting the usefulness of legal fictions, political jurisprudence
might still indicate just where truth leaves off and fiction begins
and which fictions are not purposeful tools but half-conscious
assumptions about the nature of American government that have
no basis in fact. A fiction, particularly a fiction about government,
is useful precisely to the extent that we know it is a fiction.
Beyond that point it may be more dangerous than useful. In any
event political jurisprudence will, I hope, put a stop to studies
like one I recently read-and one by a political scientist at that-
which managed to discuss the Supreme Court and federalism for
thirty pages without any reference to the substantial body of
knowledge about how American federalism actually works that
has been gathered by political science in the last thirty years. No
matter how telling the criticisms of the institutional wing of
political jurisprudence, it does provide us with much knowledge
that is plainly applicable to the analysis of many legal doctrines.
While the institutional wing has been the object of some at-
tacks, largely I believe because of sins of omission that can be
remedied, it is the wing of political jurisprudence that concen-
trates on the attitudes and actions of individual judges which has
taken most of the broadsides.
We have already noted the general distaste for statistical
examination of judicial attitudes and voting. But in fact we all
count and make at least rough quantitative assessments. What
71 See e.g., Bailey, Congress Makes A Law (1950); Gross, The Legislative
Struggle (1953); Truman, The Congressional Party (1959); Mathews, U.S.
Senators and Their World (1960); Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, Ferguson, The
Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (1962).
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practicing lawyer has not on occasion advised a client (pre-
dicted?) that a suit would be unsuccessful, not on the basis of the
legal question but because his past experience indicated that
such suits are usually lost. The experience he calls upon is
simply unconscious quantification. The gossip of every county
court house and the little internal moans or cheers that go up
when the practicing lawyer finds out which of his cases are going
to which judges, are simply unsystematic attitudinal conclusions
based on quantitative observations over time. It would take a
sternly disciplined student of constitutional law indeed not to
mentally count up to at least five when he is asked nearly any
question about the current meaning of the first amendment or
the due process clause. We all count. Some of us use our fingers
and some use statistics. Unless there is a special virtue in primi-
tive or half-conscious methods of counting, I do not see the objec-
tion to statistics. As a matter of fact both simple counting and
relatively sophisticated statistical analysis have been used by
eminently respectable and lawyer-like figures. 72 It is, therefore,
probably not statistics alone but statistics used in conjunction
with attitudinal and behavioral studies that are the main target.
There are to be sure some glaring weaknesses in the bulk
of the attitudinal research that has been done so far, the most
marked of which is its circularity. Observing that a certain judge
always votes for the civil rights claimant, the attitudinal re-
searcher says he has a "pro-civil rights attitude." Then at least
by implication the "pro-civil rights attitude" is proposed as the
cause of the pro-civil rights voting behavior.73 Thus the behavior
under another name becomes its own explanation. At best this
method is tautological.
There are also some difficulties with several of the principal
methods employed in isolating attitudes. The general logic of
Gutman scaling is not entirely clear. Its logic is further attenuated
7 2 Hart, The Time Chart of the justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84 (1959); Zeisel,
Kalven and Bucholz, Delay in the Courts (1959). See the symposium on juni-
metrics in 28 Law & Contemp. Prob. (1963).
78 1 say at least by implication because even if the attitudinal researcher
doesn't make the claim directly, he surely is not driven by idle curiosity to examine
attitudes. He must be examining them in order to explain behavior. Similarly,
where it is found that judges who are Republicans favor heavier sentences for
criminals, it is assumed that favoring heavier sentences is an aspect of Republican-
ism and then it can be concluded that Republican judges who favor heavier
sentencing do so because of their Republican attitudes.
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when scaling is transferred from the area for which it was in-
tended into the analysis of judicial attitudes. The Gutman tech-
nique was designed for the examination of a random sample from
a much larger universe. If the sample scaled, then the universe
was presumed to be orderable along a single attitude dimension.
But the scalograms of Supreme Court voting are not random
samples. The cases used are pre-selected and are chosen precisely
because the investigator hopes they reveal a single attitude
dimension. The result is that it is never certain whether the
Justices scale-that it can be arranged along a single attitudinal
dimension like pro- to anti-business-or whether the cases scale,
yielding the desired results because of the factors employed in
their non-random selection.
Attempts to derive attitudes from observation of group voting
behavior or alliances encounter similar difficulties. In the larger
world it may be possible to safely assume that a number of
people who consistently act in the same way and in conjunction
with one another share an attitude. But where only nine persons
are present and confined by an elaborate set of decisional rules
that rigidly delimit their possible choices of action, it is not safe
to infer that just because four or five Justices always vote together
on certain issues, they have the same attitudes on those issues.
Indeed bloc analysis has typically shown us a block of four and
then five Justices who automatically become a bloc because they
oppose those four although they seem to have nothing else in
common.
All this is not to say, however, that the bulk of attitudinal
research has been valueless. Quite the contrary. In the first place
the data in social science can rarely be made to "prove" anything.
Scalogram and group analysis are suggestive and provide im-
portant evidence even if they are not absolutely without scientific
flaw. Few of us would be unwilling to accept the proposition
that if a given judge always votes for the union, even when most
of his colleagues find the law to point the other way, he probably
is governed at least in part by pro-union sentiment. Secondly, the
general problems of inference can be and have been reduced by
careful extention and interpretation of the data. If a judge always
votes pro-business in business regulation cases, he might do so
for many reasons, legal or attitudinal. If he is also found to vote
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pro-business in business-labor disputes and tax cases, we surely
make a fairly good case for pro-business attitudes. Thirdly, and
this applies particularly to scalogram analysis, there is no reason
to impute lack of intellectual honesty to researchers simply
because their methods cannot guarantee absolute impartiality
and exactitude in the scientific sense. So long as we can examine
their case selection for ourselves and replicate their work, their
findings need not be treated with particular suspicion. Moreover,
some of the problems of lack of randomness in the selection of
cases to be scaled can be solved by selecting all of the cases
within a given subject area so that in effect one proves that the
universe scales by scaling the whole universe.74
Perhaps the best answer to the weakness of much of the
attitudinal research, particularly to its basic problem of circu-
larity, is more and different attitudinal research. We would
obviously be in a much better position to show the kind and
degree of relation between judicial attitudes and judicial decisions
if we were to establish the attitudes independently and then
compare them with the judges' decisions, rather than finding that
the attitudes derived from the opinions match the opinions from
which they were derived. A start has been made in this direction
by using direct questionaires to establish judicial attitudes.75
In the future both socio-economic analysis and survey research
techniques, which are widely used in the social sciences, should
be employed in the development of a body of independent data
on the attitudes of judges. Moreover, the depth interviewing
techniques recently used in the analysis of state legislatures
and now of city councils could be used to gather such data and
more especially data on the difference in attitude between judges
and other politicians, particularly on the question of how each
conceives his own political role.7
74 This technique has frequently been used in the literature cited earlier
although the problem remains as to whether the universe chosen, all the labor
cases for instance, is a universe within the logic of the Gutman method or simply
a large but non-random sample. Often in statistical work increasing the number
of cases decreases the possibility of distortion. But since the number of Justices
remains constant at nine, increasing the number of cases actually seems to
increase the chances that the cases rather than the Justices happen to scale. (I am
indebted for this latter point to John Sprague, a Ph.D. candidate at Stanford).75 Nagel, Off-the-Bench Attitudes, Judicial Decision Making (Schubert ed.
1963).
76 See Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, Ferguson, op. cit. supra note 71. Professor
Eulau is currently engaged in the application of similar techniques to the study of
city councils.
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However, since attitudinal research up to this point has been
more suggestive than conclusive, there has been some outcry that
the results have not been worth the effort, that statistical ap-
proaches have only tended to confirm what we knew already.
This argument is really part of the general debate between be-
haviorists and non-behaviorists in which the behaviorists are
accused of employing fancy methodologies to prove the common-
place. But it can hardly be possible that all our truisms and
cliches are correct since many tend to contradict one another.
Systematic analysis designed to test traditional knowledge can-
not, therefore, be wasted even when it tends only to confirm
some of our previous impressionistic notions.
Nevertheless, the problem of lack of originality seems par-
ticularly acute in the attitudinal area of political jurisprudence.
It has been further aggrevated by the kind of overenthusiastic
claims about returning the study of law from its dark corner to
the mainstream of intellectual endeavor, systematizing a pre-
viously anachronistic discipline and replacing a collection of
cliches with a new science that are to be expected in a new
intellectual movement but nevertheless bring a pang of regret
that adolescence must proceed maturity. Novel methods are not
to be confused with new results. And unfortunately most of the
old cliches that the new attitudinalists have been able to puncture
are cliches that no well informed traditionalist currently believes
or over which there had already been considerable disagreement
based on conventional analysis, disagreement that statistical
findings somewhat sharpened but did not end. After a thorough
review of the new literature, I cannot honestly say that it has so
far made any startling new contribution to our knowledge of
courts and judges. Its value has largely been in presenting further
evidence for certain already well formulated hypotheses. Again,
however, it must be insisted that this is not a negligible accom-
plishment.
An important factor in this concern over originality is that
attitudinal and small group analysis has so far been largely con-
centrated on the Supreme Court. The level of traditional scholar-
ship is so high in this area, the examination, reexamination and
comparison of data even by traditional and allegedly cumbersome
means so thorough, that no new method, statistical or otherwise,
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is likely to bring more than a small increment to what we already
know. 7 The claimed economies and capacities for original in-
sight of statistical analysis in general and more particularly of
attitudinal research will be given a better test as political juris-
prudence shifts its major emphasis away from the Supreme Court
about which in a sense we know too much. The new methods
seem best suited to the study of lower courts which have been
relatively neglected by traditional analysis and seem peculiarly
suited for statistical and sociological treatment because of the
huge amounts of data to be correlated and interpreted.
On the Inseparability of Traditional and
New Analytical Techniques78
Skimming through the recent writings of Schubert, Ulmer,
et al, the casual reader, depending upon his prejudices, might
conclude either that the new research represented a formalastic
game totally divorced from the real substance of law or a simple
and blessed release from the stylized and highly complex ma-
neuverings of traditional case analysis. The result is likely to be
a debate over whether the new techniques can independently
do the job that traditional analysis had formerly done and do it
better. Such a polemic should in general be avoided, for to my
knowledge no political jurist has ever claimed that the new
methods were either totally independent or sufficient means of
examining the work of courts. It is true, however, that for the
most part the users of new techniques have contented themselves
with the academic courtesy of conceeding the legitimacy of other
scholarly work rather than systematically explicating the de-
pendence of their own findings on traditional analysis. It might
be well then to indicate something of the inter-dependence of
new and traditional methods both to disabuse the "outsider" of
the notion that an important wing of political jurisprudence is no
more than wild-eyed scientism and to show the acolyte that he is
not relieved of the duty of learning the traditional services.
77 It might be added in passing that before we accuse the attitudinalists of
wasting time elaborately proving cliches, we might consider whether the hundreds
of thousands of often routine or formalistic words written about the Supreme
Court and its opinions every year really represent the best allocation of scholarly
resources.
78By "traditional" I mean the analysis in depth of the facts, law and reason-
ing of judicial opinions according to the dialectical conventions that lawyers andjudges normally employ.
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The scalogram has surely been the most prominent of the new
tools. Yet as we have seen the cases used in each scalogram have
not been the result of random sampling. They are carefully
selected and in most instances the inclusion or exclusion of a
given case, particularly of ambiguous or multi-issue cases, has
been supported by traditional analysis going to the substantive
legal issues. On the whole the case groupings have been just
those that any traditionalist would have chosen and have been
openly dependent on traditional analysis. Whether or not to
establish sub-scales or engage in multiple counting"9 and what
cases are to go into what sub-scale are questions that are also
largely dependent on examination of the substantive content of
the decisions.
Where a scale appears to meet statistical requirements of
reliability but is imperfect in the sense that some of the votes of
certain Justices are inconsistent with their general scale position,
these inconsistencies may be explained by peculiar factors that
become evident when the Justices' opinions are subjected to tradi-
tional analysis. Where cases that logically fit into the group of
cases to be scaled are in fact inconsistent or disruptive of the scale
patterns, these inconsistencies may be explainable by turning to
the legal issues in the case and the opinions of the Justices. Again
all this is not meant to imply that the scales have unconsciously
or obscurely smuggled in outside conclusions based on other
techniques. The employment of traditional techniques and con-
clusions has been open and purposeful.
Bloc, factor and game theory analysis are also closely tied to
traditional techniques. It is generally impossible to say that the
discovery of a bloc of four or five appellate judges constitutes
more than a purely formal statement of congruent behavior
unless the statistical presence of the bloc is supported by analysis
of the members' opinions to discover whether they express or
acknowledge attitudinal agreement. The necessity of forming
judicial as well as legislative majorities may often make strange
and antagonistic bed-fellows. A pioneering attempt at applying
factor analysis to Supreme Court behavior was able to derive
acceptable vectors and intensities but the initiators of the study
79 See Spaeth, Judicial Power As a Variable Motivating Supreme Court
Behavior, 6 Midwest J. of Politics 54 (1962), for the use of sub-sclaes and
Tannenhaus, supra note 49, for double counting.
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concluded that only subject matter specialists could give sub-
stantive labels to their formal descriptive statements." While
some game theory analysis may proceed purely on the basis of
voting behavior, most will require fairly elaborate traditional
analysis since the judicial game requires that the players govern
their strategies in part by legalistic conventions. If for no other
reason, this is true because certain of the players may place a high
premium on legal reasoning and other traditional concerns.81
Finally, attitudinal-statistical approaches can be used most
independently in those situations in which differences in judicial
behavior are most clearly explainable in terms of differences in
broad social attitudes like pro- or anti-business sentiment. If
all the judges decided all the cases on the basis of a few fixed
attitudes, we could all afford to sit back on our Gutmans. But
even the analyses of the Supreme Court done up to this time
shows clearly that things are not so simple. Scale analyses for
reasons sufficient unto the method have usually omitted unani-
mous decisions. Nevertheless such decisions make up a significant
part of the whole, are probably the least dependent on attitudinal
differences and the most related to conventional legal thinking
of all varieties of decision and, therefore, are likely to remain
heavily dependent on traditional and rather complex legal reason-
ing for explication.
More important, both bloc and scale analysis show a middle
category of Justices. Assuming for the moment that a near per-
fect scale does show that the Justices are ordered according to a
single attitude, the scales also typically show a set of intermediate
Justices falling between those who always vote for and those who
always vote against a certain social issue or policy. Their position
on the scale indicates that they hold the scaled attitude less
strongly or less extremely than those of their colleagues at the
two ends of the scale. 2 Since these Justices vote no in some of
8o Thurstone and Degan, A Factorial Study of the Supreme Court, Proceed-
ings of the National Academy of Sciences 628 (1951). Schubert has attempted to
avoid traditional analysis by using scalogram analysis to formulate suitable labels.
Schubert, A Solution to the Indeterminate Factorial Resolution of Thurstone and
Degan's Study of the Supreme Court, 7 Behavioral Science 448 (1962). But this
only transports the traditional analysis one stage backward to the construction of
the scales.81 See Schubert, supra note 33.82 But unless their votes violate the scale orderings, their intermediate position
does not show that they are inconsistent in their attitudes. In terms of Gutman
(Continued on next page)
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the categorized cases and yes in others, while their colleagues with
more strongly held attitudes tend to vote consistently yes or no,
it is precisely this intermediate category of Justice whose votes
frequently decide the Court. Thus scale and bloc analysis para-
doxically tend to show that the decisions of the Court as opposed
to the decisions of individual Justices are made on the basis of
relatively weak attitudinal differences and thus are least amena-
ble to these techniques. It is precisely those Justices whose votes
are most decisive in the disposition of cases whose behavior can
least readily and neatly be explained by proposing a direct,
unadulterated relation between their social attitudes and their
legal decisions. And because of the basic circularity of most
attitudinal research, we cannot actually tell whether these inter-
mediate Justices vote the way they do because of relatively weak
social attitudes or in spite of relatively strong ones.
It is the unanimous cases and those decided by the votes of
the intermediate Justices that are most likely to exhibit decisions
based on something more complex than simple social attitudes.
Since these constitute a major share of the Court's business, it is
likely that traditional analysis will continue to play a larger part
than the new techniques in the analysis of the Court's relations
with other political agencies.83
Attitudinal-statistical techniques are also highly dependent on
traditional analysis as a check on their conclusions. Their whole
basis is that an observed uniformity of behavior must indicate a
single attitudinal factor at play, but for any attitude other than
the attitude of following the law, this would be true only if the
data were random in the sense that the legalities of the cases
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
scaling any judge is consistent who has a distinct break between his yes (+)
and his no (-) votes with no pluses in amongst his minuses and no minuses in
amongst his pluses.83 It should be added that the long presense of two such justices as Black
and Douglas is something of an historical accident and encourages the kind of
simple social attitude analysis that seems to suddenly take all the complexities out
of public law. Ulmer struck at this oversimplification in group analysis some time
ago. See his Polar Classification of Supreme Court Justices, 12 S.C.L.Q. 407(1960). One of Schubert's most recent pieces, Civilian Control and Stare Decisis
in the Warren Court, Judicial Decision Making (Schubert ed. 1963), stresses the
complex and varying motivation of the Justices. These pieces, together with those
cited at note 84 infra, indicate an increasing tendency toward subtlized and com-
plex analysis and, of course, the more complex attitudinal-statistical analysis be-
comes the less attractive it becomes as a substitute for traditional analysis since it
looses its initially promised capability of quickly cutting through a mass of
traditional obfuscations to the simple truth.
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randomly favored first the business and then the anti-business
litigant. If a single decisional rule, i.e., a "legal" or "technical"
rule, or a series of decisional rules when applied to the selected
cases would yield the observed uniformity, then the cases are not
random and the uniformity is not conclusive for either the
identification of attitudes nor the supposition that the identified
attitude was the cause of the observed uniformity. The more
initially structured the cases, the less reliance for inferences about
attitudes may be placed in observed uniformity of decision. More
particularly, statistical standards of reliability established in areas
where data is highly random or can be'randomized are not neces-
sarily applicable in areas where data is highly structured.
The work of courts tends to be highly structured for several
reasons. First of all, a statute, either by design of the legislature
or simply because it is a single set of words with a relatively clear
meaning on its face, constantly applied to similar fact situations
may consistently favor one interest in the community over others
-indeed statutes do and are designed to do just this. Therefore,
in the area of litigation covered by a given statute, the legalities
are not likely to randomly favor one interest and then another.
Admittedly appellate courts tend to get those cases where the
legalities are not absolutely clear. It is this tendency toward
randomness that makes attitudinal-statistical studies even pass-
ingly plausible. But most cases do clearly arise under a single
statute. Typically cases under a given statute tend to keep com-
ing to appellate courts because two alternative interpretations
continue to be held by different judges or litigants. But once a
single appellate judge has determined that interpretation X is
correct, he is likely to consistently interpret the statute as meaning
X even though other legal authorities believe it to mean Y.
Furthermore it is not outside the realm of probabilities that he
chooses interpretation X not because it suits his attitudes about
what interest should be favored but because he believes that the
legislature really intended or the plain meaning of the statutory
language really requires interpretation X although some of his
colleagues disagree. Indeed he may feel that the reason why the
case comes up on appeal is that the legislators really intended X
and those people-including judges-who wish they had intended
Y keep trying to read Y into the statute. Thus a judge who decides
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cases under a statute that he feels favors business may issue con-
sistently pro-business opinions because he desires to enforce the
statute not because he has a pro-business attitude or allows his
economic attitudes to dominate his legal views.
Attitudinal-statistical approaches may attempt to overcome
this phenomenon by drawing their categories broadly so that
cases arising under two or more statutes are thrown together. Any
uniformity that is observed then cannot be ascribed entirely to
the phenomenon described above. But admitting that legislatures
are not entirely consistent in always choosing one interest over
another and are not notorious for highly coordinated legislative
programs, it is probable that two or more statutes which are
closely enough related to be lumped together for attitudinal
research may very well have been inspired by similar legislative
choices as to which interest should be favored. It is not incon-
ceivable that two statutes both of which will involve business-
men as litigants are both clearly intended by the legislature to
favor business interests so that consistently pro-business decisions
under both statutes may still establish only a judge's desire to
follow Congressional intent not a pro-business attitude. Of
course, the more statutes are lumped in a given category the
less liklihood there is of consistent legislative intent. Neverthe-
less, it is probable that many interlocking series of statutes are
intended, either consciously or as a result of the long dominant
position of a given political coalition in the legislature, to con-
sistently favor certain interests over others.
The materials of judicial decision are further structured by
the phenomenon of litigation as a form of political activity.
Interest groups frequently undertake campaigns of litigation
aimed at getting the courts to change the existing state of either
the case or decisional law. Or they may resort to the courts
precisely because they find that the current state of the law in
the courts favors them more than the current state of other
political arenas. Opinions consistently favoring a given group
may not mean that the judge is shaping the law to favor the
group, but that the group has found that the existing law favored
them and resorted to the courts precisely for this reason. Thus
the cases that come before the courts may not be random on their
legalities but preselected by litigating groups.
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Administrative and regulatory agencies frequently find that,
due to changes in economic or social conditions, a statute whose
intent has long been acknowledged, or a line of decisions that
is clear and consistent, is now yielding undesirable results, i.e.,
results that favor social interests that the agency does not favor.
Such agencies may persistently litigate cases with the hope of
getting judicial amendments. For instance, the National Trans-
portation Policy was framed in the 1930's when trucking was an
infant industry and, therefore, it provided special aids to truckers
vis 'a vis railroads. The ICC, applying the act in the 1960's, may
repeatedly attempt to shift its thrust to end a favoritism that
seems unwarranted in today's changed circumstances. The agency
may try to accomplish this goal by petitioning Congress to amend
the act or alternatively by issuing a set of pro-railroad, anti-truck
rulings in marginal cases. In the subsequent litigation, the com-
mission seeks to gradually nudge the Supreme Court into accept-
ing its views and thus amend the statute without legislative
action. Is a judge who consistently resists the prod of the ICC
exhibiting an anti-regulatory agency or pro-railroad attitude, or
is he simply attempting to obey Congressional commands how-
ever outdated and incorrect they may be?
Again this problem can be overcome by extending the range
of cases considered to cover more than the truck certification
business of the ICC or more than one regulatory agency. But it
is also likely that there are institutional pressures that cause all
the regulatory agencies to push against outdate commands of
Congress so that a consistent anti-regulatory agency position
might evidence not a pro-business, anti-regulation attitude but a
pro-Congress anti-amendment-without-statute attitude. In other
words, the cases may be read Regulatory Agency v. Business but
be decided Regulatory Agency v. Congress.
The pool of litigation is thus not a random one but is often
marked by litigational campaigns that may bring similar parties
under similar legal rubrics to an appellate court over and over
again. Uniformity of decision may, therefore, indicate either an
attitude favoring a given variety of party or an attempt to main-
tain a consistent position toward the legal rubric.
Finally, correspondence of litigating party with legal rule
litigated may lead to consistencies that seem ordered on the basis
[Vol. 52.,
POLITICAL JUBISPRUDENCE
of social attitudes but in fact reflect some other structuring of
the materials. This is perhaps only a variation of what I have just
written. Even without conscious litigational campaigns, certain
kinds of people will consistently invoke the protection of certain
constitutional provisions, statutes or previous court decisions. It
is the poor who usually invoke the right to counsel clause, labor
unions that invoke certain of the unfair labor practices provisions
of the National Labor Relations Act, Negroes who invoke Brown
v. Board. A judge who has no markedly pro-Negro attitude might
nevertheless consistently vote for Negroes if all the cases that
reached his court involving Negroes were educational desegrega-
tion cases. A judge who had no particular love of labor unions
might compile a wonderfully pro-union record if all the labor
cases involved prohibited, employer, anti-union practices. Of
course all the cases involving Negroes are not desegregation
cases and all the cases involving unions are not employer
practices cases. But there is a sufficient level of correspondence
between party and legal rule that a given line of decisions by a
given judge may sometimes indicate commitment to a given in-
terpretation of the rule rather than an attitude toward the parties.
It is true that commitment to a given interpretation of the rule
may itself be initially the result of an attitude toward the parties,
but unless one entirely rejects legal training and logic as operative
forces in the judicial mind, such commitment might alternatively
be the result of rational-legal calculation based on the perhaps
incorrect notion that laws do have an objective meaning whether
we like it or not.
I am not suggesting that all of these factors are always
operating or even that any one of them is always operating
sufficiently to render attitudinal-statistical analysis inoperative.
However, in every instance where statistical methods are em-
ployed, traditional analysis will be necessary to isolate and assess
these factors and determine to what extent they undercut the
statistical propositions. In some instances such analysis may
result in discarding the statistical propositions. In others, it will
be used to indicate that no undermining factors can be discovered.
In a great many instances of course, the result will be something
between full abandonment or acceptance of the initial attitudinal
analysis.
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A word further must be said about the statistical extension
and manipulation of categories to avoid or at least mitigate the
three problems of non-randomness sketched here. Broadening
categories is not an automatic or complete solution. Let us say
we are attempting to establish a pro-civil liberties attitude. We
begin with freedom of speech and show that judge X consistently
disfavors speech claims. When we are told that this may be be-
cause all the speech cases in question involve state action and thus
issues of federalism, we add no-establishment of religion cases
and show that he disfavors all such claims. In reply we are told
that he may do so not because he is anti-civil fights but because
he is convinced by historical research that the no-establishment
clause was not intended by the framers to create a wall of
separation. As we add areas, we may be greeted each time by a
new decision rule based on legislative intent, stare decisis, judicial
modesty, reasoning from neutral principles etc, which explains
the judges behavior on grounds totally divorced from civil rights
attitudes. When we find that the sum total of all these decisional
rules just happens to be a consistently anti-civil rights position,
we may be suspicious, but our respondent may be right. There
will rarely be enough categories available for introduction to
statistically prove that it is an anti-civil rights attitude that
motivates the decisional pattern and not a series of inter-related
or even independent decisional rules which coincidently yield
consistent anti-civil rights results. It is not beyond the realm of
belief and certainly not beyond the realm of statistical possibility
that four or five firmly held legal doctrines largely divorced from
any single social attitude may in thirty or forty cases yield a
pattern that falsely suggests such an attitude.
The same kind of problem exists when analysis proceeds by
reduction. Let us suppose that we suggest that Justice X is anti-
business and our respondent replies that most of the decisions
on which we base our conclusions are regulatory cases and in
fact what they show is that the Justice defers to administrative
expertise. We then reply that Justice X has upheld seventy
per cent of the regulatory commission decisions unfavorable to
the regulated firms but only fourteen per cent of those favorable
to them. Our respondent replies yes, but your eighty-six per cent
of favorable agency findings rejected by Justice X are all cases in
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which the administrative agency went beyond its expertise and
attempted to in effect amend the statute without Congressional
consent. Again we may be suspicious, but we are unlikely to be
dealing with numbers large enough or a universe sufficiently
suitable to "prove" our case statistically. Probably our best bet
at this point would be to return to traditional legal analysis in
order to discover whether the cases in which favorable agency
findings were rejected are really distinguishable from the others
and consistent with the position toward agencies taken by the
Justice in the opinions initially labeled anti-business.
Finally, those committed to attitudinal approaches are at-
tempting to avoid many of the problems I have suggested by
including 'legalistic" attitudes among those to be studied. 4 But
this returns us directly to traditional legal analysis as an integral
part of constructing categories for statistical use. The nice thing
about pro and anti-business or civil rights or economic liberalism
labels was that attitude categories could be constructed without
case analysis simply by looking to the nature of the parties who
had won and lost in the best "bad man's law" tradition. The work'
of Grossman and Spaeth suggests that when we begin dealing
with judicial attitudes about law and the judicial process instead
of about U.S. Steel and the AFL-CIO, we can only frame cate-
gories of cases that will isolate such factors, save for a few areas
that are purely jurisdictional, by traditional analysis of the cases.
There is no other way to divine which cases struck which of the
Justices as raising procedural, role of the Court, or interpretory
problems just as or more important than the nature of the two
parties.85
84 Spaeth, supra: note 79. Grossman, Role Playing and the Analysis of
Judicial Behavior. The Case of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 11 J. Pub. L. 285 (1962).
85 Grossman's criterion for choosing cases to scale for his research is "quetion
of jurisdiction, federalism, deference to some other governing unit within the
system or any question involving the right or propriety of the Supreme Court
deciding the case... [where] ... the issue of judicial responsibility was raised."
Grossman supra note 84, at 298. Spaeth uses three criteria. 1. Where the fact situa-
tion, issues requiring resolution and the points emphasized in the opinions clearly
indicate the dominance of considerations of Supreme Court power as the basis for
the Court's decision. 2. Those cases that did not scale on certain social attitudes
(civil rights, business, labor, etc.) indices. 3. Comity and Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure cases. Spaeth, supra note 79, at 56-57. Obviously a considerable
amount of traditional analysis is necessary in order to employ these criteria. Note
that Spaeth's second category indicates the progressive introduction of more and
more levels of analysis when the simplest categories do not provide a complete
explanation. See also Spaeth, An Approach to the Study of Attitudinal Differences
As an Aspect of Judicial Behavior, 5 Midwestern J. of Political Science 165 (1961).
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Moreover such attitudes are much more difficult to isolate and
express in the yes-no or plus-minus language of statistics than
hypothesized attitudes toward the parties and tend to return the
study of judicial motivation to the rather murky mixture of legal
reasoning and social judgments from which the simple format
and glorious white space of scalograms sometimes seems to be
rescuing it.
In summary then, traditional analysis plays an important role
in establishing the categories and format of the new forms of
analysis, is required for support and interpretation of the findings
of such analysis and is frequently a convenient proof or check on
both its methods and conclusions. In this connection it should
be added that some of the political jurists have been guilty of a
considerable number of errors or overstatements and their con-
clusions have been subject to a number of specific criticisms that
could have been avoided or anticipated by more thorough
traditional analysis and exposition.8" These errors are doubly
unfortunate because they are often seized upon to discredit the
new methods when in fact they are simply evidence that few of
us are perfect in our scholarship, traditional or otherwise.87
Traditional, statistical and behavioral techniques are now
inextricably mixed in political jurisprudence and will undoubtedly
remain so. Not all political jurists need use all of them nor need
we waste time trying to determine an orthodox "mix." Either
in the mind of a single scholar or the complementary work of
several, most problems in political jurisprudence will require a
variety of approaches in order to build up a cumulative solution.
The Perennial Question-Is and Ought
Critical students of jurisprudence who have bothered to fol-
low me this far are likely by now to have two dread words,
naive and positivism, ready at hand. It must be confessed that
either out of naivete, or because many of its participants see
86 Cramton and Zeisel, Reoew of Schubert Quantitative Analysis of Supreme
Court Opinions, 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 174 (19605; Mendelson, The Neo-Behavioral
Approach to the judicial Process: A Critique, 57 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 593 (1963).
87 It would be possible to construct a considerable catalogue of errors, over-
statements and incompletely supported conclusions in the new work. But errors
should be pointed out and corrections made in the course of careful reinvestigation
of particular problems not by polemic sharp shooting. Traditional analysis will
undoubtedly play a considerable role in this process.
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themselves primarily as political scientists not students of law,
political jurisprudence so far has failed to provide itself a theo-
retical rationale that grapples with the problems of twentieth
century legal philosophy. This is a serious flaw in a movement
that is so heavily dependent on sociological jurisprudence and
legal realism both because there have been serious theoretical
differences between the two and because each has been chal-
lenged by a revived idealism. However, I do not think this flaw
is a fatal one because neither the conflict between sociological
jurisprudence and realism nor the debate between positivism and
idealism have yet been resolved. For the moment at least
political jurisprudence can attach itself to the realist and positivist
causes and refer its attackers to a set of arguments hallowed by
extended if not particularly fruitful development.88 Nevertheless
the strength of the revival of various forms of natural law juris-
prudence requires some comment on the particular relation of
political jurisprudence to the normative or valuational aspects of
legal philosophy.
Political jurisprudence is basically positivistic in the sense of
seeking to describe the political-legal processes as it is rather
than prescribing how it ought to be. But if political jurisprudence
is positivism, it is a peculiarly value-laden kind of positivism.
The whole attitudinal wing is, of course, attempting to discover
what values the participants in law-making hold and how these
values affect their law-making activity. The essentially political
inquiry into what governmental tasks the courts do efficiently
and what services they fail to perform satisfactorily includes a
determination of how well the courts function as creators and
appliers of moral standards.8 9 The general emphasis of political
88The positivism v. idealism rubric is, of course, rather bad shorthand
since it uses the labels that each side pins on its opponents. Yntema, American
Legal Realism in Retrospect, 14 Vand. L. Rev. 317 (1960), provides a concise
outline of the former debate and Weissman, An Antitrust Law, Too, Must Be Just,
1962 Wis. L. Rev. 403, of the latter. The parallel debate in political science
can be followed in Book Review Essay, 57 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 125 (1963). The
close relation between realism and political jurisprudence can be seen in Llewellyn,
Law and the Social Sciences-Especially Sociology, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1286 (1949).
Llewelyn's partial withdrawal from realism in Deciding Appeals, the Common Law
Tradition (1962), has been attacked from the standpoint of political jurisprudence.
See Clark and Trubek, The Creative Role of the Judge; Restraint and Freedom in
the Common Law Tradition, 71 Yale L.J. 255 (1961).89 See Shapiro, Morals and the Courts: The Reluctant Crusaders, 45 Minn. L.
Rev. 897 (1961).
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jurisprudence on judge as policy-maker inevitably has made
the demand that judges articulate their values and social goals an
integral part of political jurisprudence.90 For policy-making is by
its very nature purposive activity implying a choice between
alternative means and ends based on some notion of the goods.
The judge as policy-maker must, therefore, make moral choices.
I am well aware that many scholars view the reduction of
values to psychological data, which then become part of the
"is," as the final positivistic rape of moral philosophy. Similarly
the emphasis on purposive elements in law-making may be
viewed as a false reduction of law to will and appetite ignoring
elements of reason and justice. Finally a jurisprudence which
claims that the ought is an essential part of law, while at the
same time devoting itself entirely to the is, may well be accused
of either insincerity or misdirection. In the face of these argu-
ments, it is not entirely satisfactory to say that political juris-
prudence, by emphasizing the political and, therefore, valuation
or purposive nature of law, provides a gateway for the passage
from empirical to normative study. A gateway is not enough.
Some one must go through it and tell us what is beyond.
But if political jurisprudence in the end shows itself incom-
plete, it at least points to the reasons for its own incompleteness
and, indeed, for the unresolved quality of all modem juris-
prudence. Since law and law-making are an integral part of
politics, legal philosophy is an integral part of political philo-
sophy. The problem of those who wish to create a value oriented
rather than descriptive jurisprudence is that, apart from the Neo-
Scholastics, they have been unable to formulate a coherent and
generally acceptable statement of the values around which a new
jurisprudence could be built. Indeed since the admittedly sub-
philosophical jural postulates of Roscoe Pound, nearly all the talk
has been of the need for and means of finding moral principles
rather than the substance of those principles.9' The reason for
90 See Miller and Howell The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 661(960); Miller, A Note on Supreme Court Decisions,
10 J. Pub. L. 139 (1961). Professors Lasswell and McDougal have long called
for the systematic enunciation of values in law. For the close connection between
their call for valuation and a view of courts as political agencies see Lasswell, The
Interplay of Economic, Political and Social Criteria in Legal Policy, 14 Vand. L.
Rev. 451 (1961).91 See e.g., Northrop, The Complexities of Legal and Ethical Experience
(1959).
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this failure is quite obviously the failure of post-Marxian political
philosophy to provide any acceptable "truths" about the nature
and ends of the government, 92 and more particularly the failure
of liberal-democratic philosophy, busy defending its threatened
procedural axioms, to come to grips with the substantive issues
that lie behind the phrase "public interest."9 3 The Neo-Scholastics
in fact can appear so self-satisfied and complete only because they
deal with law with a capital (or natural) L, or point out the
contradictions of other political philosophers, rather than attempt-
ing the real and much more difficult task of integrating scholastic
theories of law into modem Catholic political philosophy, a
philosophy that has yet to prove itself congruent with modem
industrial society.
Until political philosophy revives sufficiently to provide us
with a set of ultimate truths or a reasonable facsimile thereof,
jurisprudence is likely to concern itself with more immediate
questions. There is a whole range of intermediate ought problems
that we must solve now even though our ultimates are shaky.
Ought property owners be forced to sell to Negroes? Ought
competetive sectors of the economy be allowed to become oligo-
polistic? Ought the jurisdiction of juvenile courts be extended?
If political jurisprudence provides us with some information on
the functions of law-makers in our society, and in the process
prods those law-makers into conscious political evaluation of their
own governmental roles and the role of government in general, it
will have contributed as much and perhaps more to the valu-
ational aspects of jurisprudence as its contemporaries.
92 See Shklar, After Utopia (1957).
93 See Schubert, The Pu lic Interest (Friedrich ed. 1962).
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[Reproduction of Fig. 6 from Schubert, The Study of Judicial
Decision Making, 52 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1015 (1958).]
This is a perfect scale. An inconsistency would occur if justice
Douglas, for instance, had voted against the accused in House v.
Mayo or Justice Frankfurter for the accused in Foster v. Illinois.
In this scale eleven or more such inconsistencies would normally
lead to the conclusion that the data did not actually scale, i.e.,
was not orderable to show a single attitude.
0 0
0 0
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.Douglas 80 -67 50 34 30 31 34 -30
Black 80 77 58 44 37 36 46 :31
Warren 67 77 6 54- 55 53 55 .42 ZHDH Or
Clark 50 58 76 64 86851 55 46 nmmnAGREE1IEN
Minton 34 44 54 64 74 61: 54 49 II[ Mt]=.747I I
Reed 30 37 55 168 74 71 48 51 II[Center],=.678
Burton 31 36 53 65 61 71 61 elmI[igt -. 687
Frankfurter 34 46 55 55 54 48 1,61 801 1I(Wa-C) =.760
Harlan 30 31 42 46 49 51 165 80
%of assent: 70 78 88 89 81 80 79 80 71
[Reproduction of Fig. 2 from Schubert, The Study of Judicial
Decision Making, 52 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1011 (1958).]
The numbers represent the total number of paired votes in
the selected cases. Thus Black voted in agreement with Douglas
in eighty of the selected cases but with Harlan in only thirty-one.
Clark is identified in this diagram as a "swing" Justice.
